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ENHANCED INJURY THEORY: AN
ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK
THOMAS V. HARRist
Enhanced injury liability rests upon ordinary tort concepts of duty,
causation, and forseeability; yet it presents special problems ofproof,
affirmative defense, and allocation of liability among defendants. Many
of these problems await resolution by the state courts; others have been
the subject of inconsistent decisions. In this Article Mr. Harris analyzes
the doctrinal and social policy bases of enhanced injury liability, and
reviews the cases applying an enhanced injury analysis. He develops an
analysis of enhanced injury cases, drawingfrom generalproducts liabil-
ity law while remaining sensitive to the particularproblems of enhanced
injury litigation.
Most American jurisdictions have adopted the doctrine of strict liability
in tort' and thus have recognized an injured party's right to recover damages
for injuries caused by a defective product.2 In 1965 the doctrine was recog-
nized and promoted by section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.3
In those states that have adopted 4 section 402A, a claimant can recover if the
defective product caused an injury-producing accident. After some disagree-
" Shareholder, Merrick, Hofstedt & Lindsey, P.S., Seattle, Washington. A.B. 1970,
Harvard, J.D. 1973, Cornell.
1. The various states that have adopted the doctrine are listed in 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIED-
MAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, § 16A[3] n.2 (1983). See also infra note 4.
2. The landmark decision in this area was Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d
57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). Of course, injured parties previously had been able to
recover against manufacturers and other defendants if they could prove negligence. See, e.g.,
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965), provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his prod-
uct, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
4. Most states have expressly adopted either the Restatement's formulation of the doctrine
or its seminal principles. The jurisdictions that have adopted § 402A are listed in Carestia, The
Interaction of Comparative Negligence and Strict Products Liability-here Are We?, 47 INS.
COUNSEL J. 53, 57 nn.47-48 (1980). Several states, however, have modified or altered substantive
Restatement provisions. See, e.g., Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 150-53, 542
P.2d 774, 777-79 (1975) (discussing the various states' approaches to the "unreasonably danger-
ous" and "defective product" terminology in § 402A). Two recently published tort and product
liability codes contain provisions fundamentally different from the approach taken in § 402A. See
UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT, 12 U.L.A. 35 (Supp. 1983); UNIF. PROD. LIAB. ACT, 44 Fed.
Reg. 62,714 (1979).
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ment, it has been widely recognized that a manufacturer will also be held lia-
ble for enhanced injuries resulting from a defect even if the defect did not
cause the underlying accident.5
A party litigating an enhanced injury claim is confronted with an "uncer-
tain area of law" and a "myriad of [as yet unresolved] problems."' 6 While they
have recognized the viability of enhanced injury theory, the states have not
been active in developing a conceptual framework for the resolution of such
claims. 7 The federal courts, in exercising diversity jurisdiction, have taken the
lead in defining the parameters of enhanced injury theory. As one federal
judge noted:
This is an Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,. .. case, but it must be con-
ceded that the lore of "strict liability" and "second collision" tends to
be generalized across state boundaries and to borrow precedent from
the federal courts. But the bellwether in the second collision field has
been Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 8th Cir. 1968. .... 8
This dearth of state court doctrinal development has been widely criticized.9
5. Most courts that have addressed the issue have recognized the right to recover for en-
hanced injuries. The landmark decision allowing recovery was Larsen v. General Motors Corp.,
391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968). The leading decision rejecting the concept of enhanced injury liabil-
ity, Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966), was overruled in Huff v. White
Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1977). In Seese v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 648 F.2d 833, 840
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 867 (1981), the court noted that most jurisdictions considering the
issue had adopted the Larsen approach.
6. Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 243, 245 (2d Cir. 1981).
7. In Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 733 n.2 (3d Cir. 1976), the court of appeals noted that
the "major" cases involving enhanced injury liability have been litigated in federal courts. The
Supreme Court of Washington has the distinction of being the one state court that has expressly
admitted that it has not addressed the central issues relating to the criteria, definitions, and limita-
tions of enhanced injury liability. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 148-50, 542
P.2d 774, 776-77 (1975). Unfortunately, even after the Seattle-First Natl Bank decision, both the
Washington courts and legislature have failed to further define the parameters of that state's en-
hanced injury concept. See Bernal v. American Honda Motor Co., 87 Wash. 2d 406, 553 P.2d 107
(1976) (the only issue properly before the court was the viability of plaintiffs enhanced injury
theory); Tort and Product Liability Reform Act, ch. 27, 1981 Wash. Laws 112 (codified at WASH.
REv. COD ANN. §§ 7.72.010-7.72.060 (Supp. 1983) (court did not even address enhanced injury
theory and its need for particularized treatment different from that in ordinary tort cases),
8. Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 468 F. Supp. 593, 603 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'dinparl on
other grounds, 647 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1981). Diversity jurisdiction has itself come under attack, In
Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 732-33 (3d Cir. 1976), the Third Circuit reiterated Chief Justice
Burger's concern about the "impracticality of the federal diversity forum."
9. Sours v. General Motors Corp., 717 F.2d 1511, 1520-21 (6th Cir. 1983) (court spared the
"unenviable" task of resorting to "tea leaves or to judicial tarot cards" only because the alleged
error was harmless); Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 647 F.2d 241,243 (2d Cir. 1981) ("difficult
task" in this "uncertain area of the law"); Higginbotham v. Ford Motor Co., 540 F.2d 762, 771
(5th Cir. 1976) ("straining for clairvoyance"); Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 733 n.2 (3d Cir.
1976) (federal courts furnish "unauthoritative and diverse prognostications" on how state courts
would rule); Wooten v. White Trucks, 514 F.2d 634, 636 (5th Cir. 1975) ("ironic" that the parame-
ters of this "diversity-bound theory" of liability should be set by federal courts); Passwaters v.
General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270, 1277 (8th Cir. 1972) ("disliking the task" of predicting state
enhanced injury law).
The recent status of enhanced injury law in North Carolina illustrates the problem. By mid-
1981, North Carolina's appellate courts had not determined whether there was any legal theory
that would allow a claimant to recover for enhanced injuries. They had, however, expressly held
that a manufacturer's duty was governed by negligence theory. Wilson v. Lowe's Asheboro Hard-
ware, Inc., 259 N.C. 660, 664, 131 S.E.2d 501, 503 (1963). With that background, the District
Court for the District of New Jersey, applying North Carolina tort law, predicted that North
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Litigants, as well as the federal courts, have been forced ° into the "hazardous
occupation"' 11 of predicting, rather than applying, 12 the legal principles that
the states will enforce in enhanced injury cases.
The development of a system for the adjudication of enhanced injury
cases is a complex process. The conceptualization and implementation of such
a new liability theory requires fresh legal thinking. 13 Judicial and statutory
rules governing ordinary negligence and products liability cases cannot be
mechanically applied in enhanced injury litigation.' 4 Concepts must be care-
fully formulated to reflect the philosophical and policy considerations inherent
in the enhanced injury theory of recovery.' 5 The undeveloped state of en-
hanced injury theory heightens the need to formulate rules in a logical and
evenhanded manner. Those rules then can be applied in an intellectually jus-
tifiable way to the additional issues that undoubtedly will be raised in the
future.
Any such system must have clear and predictable standards 16 regarding
Carolina's courts would both adopt the doctrine of strict liability in tort and allow recovery for
enhanced injuries. See Seese v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 648 F.2d 833, 836 (3d Cir.) (summary of
the district court proceedings), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 867 (1981). During the pendency of the Seese
appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court refused to adopt the principle of strict liability in tort.
Smith v. Fiber Controls Corp., 300 N.C. 669, 678, 268 S.E.2d 504, 510 (1980). In Seese the Third
Circuit affirmed the trial court judgment. 648 F.2d at 835. The court admitted that the strict
liability in tort theory was improperly submitted to the jury, but affirmed the judgment after it
"predicted" that the same state court that rejected the doctrine of strict liability would allow such
a claim to be asserted as a "crashworthiness" claim. Id. at 837, 841. Subsequently, in Wilson v.
Ford Motor Co., 656 F.2d 960 (4th Cir. 1981), the Fourth Circuit, in affirming the District Court
for the Western District of North Carolina's dismissal of an enhanced injury claim, "forecasted"
that the North Carolina Supreme Court would not allow recovery for enhanced injuries. See also
Alexander v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 346 F. Supp. 320, 322-23, 327 (W.D.N.C. 1971) (rejecting
enhanced injury doctrine noting that no North Carolina court had adopted it).
10. Some states have statutes authorizing federal courts to certify questions of local law to
that state's highest appellate court. See UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT, 12
U.L.A. 49-56 (1975); id. at 17 (Supp. 1983) (21 states and territories have adopted the Act).
11. Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064, 1069 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
12. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals recognized the need for such predictability in Hud-
dell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 736 n.5 (3d Cir. 1976).
13. Id. at 742.
14. See infra notes 195-97, 236-47 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 195-97, 236-47 and accompanying text. See also Caiazzo v. Volkswagen-
werk, A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 246 (2d Cir. 1981); Lee v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 1982-1983 PROD.
LIAB. REP. (CCH) 22,699, 22,704 (Okla. 1982) (motion for rehearing pending).
16. The resolution of an enhanced injury claim often involves the application of other
equally important aspects of a state's tort liability system. Consequently, a state's enhanced injury
theory must be conceptually consistent with that state's basic product liability theory, and with its
rules regarding joint and several liability, comparative fault, indemnity, contribution, and evi-
dence. The Department of Commerce has recognized that the diversity among the various states'
tort systems is an absolute obstacle to the development of a unified system for resolving product
liability claims. See MODEL UNIF. PROD. LIAB. ACT (UPLA), 44 Fed. Reg. 62,716 (1979).
Although offered as a model state act, the MODEL UNIF. PROD. LLAB. ACT (1979) has not
been adopted in full in any state. See REPORT OF THE SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE,
AND TRANSPORTATION ON SENATE BILL 2631, S. REP. No. 670, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1982). In
reporting S. 2631, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation proposed a
federal "Product Liability Act" that would create uniform national products liability standards.
The private National Product Liability Council (P.O. Box 11111, Cincinnati, Ohio 45211
(founded in 1976)) opposes such federal legislation. The Council put forth the following objection:
While a federal solution could be narrowly tailored so as not to disrupt traditional fed-
1984]
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the scope of the duty owed to the public, the elements of a prima facie case,
the burden of proof, the method of proof, comparative defenses, the recovery
of indemnity and contribution, and the manner in which the court will instruct
a jury. To a significant extent, the specific concepts and rules proposed in this
Article are based upon the enhanced injury "lore" developed by the federal
courts. Certain issues, which even the federal courts have not resolved, re-
quire the application of legal principles that courts have used to resolve analo-
gous legal problems.
I. THE PARAMETERS OF ENHANCED INJURY THEORY
A. The Concept
Enhanced injury liability is based on the premise that some objects, while
they are not made for the purpose of undergoing impact, should be reasonably
designed to minimize the injury-producing effect of such contact. In Larsen V.
General Motors Corp. 17 the court discussed the nature of this type of liability:
Automobiles are made for use on the roads and highways in trans-
porting persons and cargo to and from various points. This intended
use cannot be carried out without encountering in varying degrees
the statistically proved hazard of injury-producing impacts of various
types.
No rational basis exists for limiting recovery to situations where the
defect in design or manufacture was the causative factor of the acci-
dent, as the accident and the resultant injury. . . all are foreseeable.
We perceive of no sound reason, either in logic or experience, nor
any command in precedent, why the manufacturer should not be
held to a reasonable duty of care in the design of its vehicle conso-
eral-state relationships, certain reforms are necessary in all tort actions and those should
be implemented through the States. With these principles in mind, the Council rejected
solutions which would burden an already over-worked federal judiciary, disrupt tradi-
tional tort law doctrines or present constitutional problems in the drafting. See, e.g.,
Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 355 N.E.2d 903 (Ohio Common Pleas, 1976)
(compulsory arbitration of medical malpractice claims violates due process and equal
protection); Wright v. Central DuPage Hospital Assoc., 347 N.E. 736 (1976) (dollar limit
on medical malpractice claims invalidated). See also Carolina Environmental Study
Group, Inc. et al. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, (W.D.N.C. No. C-C-73-139,
March 31, 1977) (statute limiting recovery in the event of catastrophic nuclear accidents
violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution; citing Wrght,
supra, with approval).
National Product Liability Council, Memorandum in Support of the Model Product Liability Act
1I-1 (1982). Neither S. 2631 nor any kindred bill has been passed by the Senate.
Ultimately, rules governing enhanced injury litigation should be included as part of a com-
prehensive tort and products liability code. At this juncture, no tort or products liability code has
been generally accepted. The judiciary's case-by-case approach to doctrinal development is inher-
ently limited and time consuming. See MODEL UNIF. PROD. LIAB. AcT, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714
(1979) (introduction); Act of April 17, 1981, ch. 27, § 1, 1981 Wash. Laws 112 (preamble to Wash-
ington's 1981 Tort and Product Liability Reform Act).
17. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
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nant with the state of the art to minimize the effect of accidents.' 8
The proper terminology for characterizing this theory is "enhanced in-
jury" liability.' 9 In addition to that term, courts and commentators have de-
scribed such accidents as involving "crashworthiness" 20 or a "second
collision."21 In many cases, courts have used the three terms interchangea-
bly.22 In so doing, they have unintentionally masked the broad applicability
18. Id at 501-03.
19. Courts have used this terminology in the following cases: Seese v. Volkswagenwerk,
A.G., 648 F.2d 833, 838 n.7 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 867 (1981); Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d
726, 737-38 (3d Cir. 1976); Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1069 n.3 (4th
Cir. 1974); Wilson v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 445 F. Supp. 1368, 1370 n.1 (E.D. Va. 1978);
Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 150, 542 P.2d 774, 776 (1975).
20. Courts have used the term "crashworthiness" to describe this type of liability in the fol-
lowing cases: Seese v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 648 F.2d 833, 835, 838 n.7 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 867 (1981); Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 243 n.2 (2d Cir. 1981);
Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 737-38 (3d Cir. 1976); Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489
F.2d 1066, 1069 n.2 (4th Cir. 1974); Olsen v. United States, 521 F. Supp. 59, 63 (E.D. Pa. 1981),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 732 (1983); Wilson v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 445 F. Supp. 1368, 1370 n.1
(E.D. Va. 1978); Arbet v. Gussarson, 66 Wis. 2d 551, 553, 225 N.W.2d 431, 433 (1975).
21. Courts have used the term "second collision" to describe this type of litigation in the
following cases: Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 669 F.2d 1199, 1203 (8th Cir. 1982); Caiazzo
v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 243 n.2 (2d Cir. 1981); Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726,
737-38 (3d Cir. 1976); Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1069 n.2 (4th Cir.
1974); Olsen v. United States, 521 F. Supp. 59, 63 (E.D. Pa. 1981), aff'dmenL, 688 F.2d 823 (3d
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 732 (1983); Jeng v. Witters, 452 F. Supp. 1349, 1355, 1360 (M.D.
Pa. 1978), ajf'd mena, 591 F.2d 1335 (3d Cir. 1979); Wilson v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 445 F.
Supp. 1368, 1370 n.1 (E.D. Va. 1978); Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 207, 321
A.2d 737, 744 (1974); Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 516, 513
P.2d 268, 274 (1973).
22. See, e.g., Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 737-38 (3d Cir. 1976); Dreisonstok v. Volkswa-
genwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1069 n.3 (4th Cir. 1974); Wilson v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 445 F.
Supp. 1368, 1370 n.1 (E.D. Va. 1978). In Seese v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 648 F.2d 833, 838 n.7
(3dCir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 867 (1981), the court explicitly stated that the terms "injury en-
hancement" and "crashworthiness" were interchangeable. In Olsen v. United States, 521 F. Supp.
59, 63 (E.D. Pa. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 732 (1983), the court commented that the terms
"crashworthiness" and "second collision" were "merely alternative expresssions for the [same]
notion."
The terms "crashworthiness" and "second collision" tend to be used interchangeably. See
Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 243 n.2 (2d Cir. 1981). In Bohm v. Triumph
Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 151, 157-58, 305 N.E.2d 769, 772, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644, 649 (1973), the New York
Court of Appeals expressly rejected the term "crashworthiness": "The extent of that assumption,
however, should be no greater than those 'second collision' injuries which would result from an
impact in a reasonably designed and constructed vehicle . . . . [A] vehicle need not be made
'crash-worthy' .. " See also Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 243 n.2 (2d Cir.
1981) (defining "crashworthiness"). Actually, the Court of Appeals' distinction inBolm was prob-
ably based upon its failure to understand that "crashworthy" does not mean "crashproof." Cf.
Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1070 (4th Cir. 1984) (no manufacturer's
obligation to build a "crash-proof' car); Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 503 (8th
Cir. 1968) (crash-proof vehicle cannot be designed).
One commentator has sought to draw a definitional distinction between the terms "crash-
worthy" and "second collision." See Foland, Enhanced Injury: Problems of Proof in "Second Colli-
sion" and "Crashworthy" Cases, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 600, 606-07 (1977). According to Foland, the
distinction is both "subtle" and "obtuse.' Id He feels that a "second collision" theory deals with
injuries caused by a "specifie" defective part, while a "crashworthiness" theory involves the failure
of a vehicle to provide "overall protection" to its occupants. Id at 607. In fact, such a distinction
is a labored one and is of no analytical aid. As the Olsen court recognized:
Terms such as these, however, may be more attractive because of their brevity than they
are useful from the viewpoint of comprehension. It is plainly preferable to concentrate
on clearly explaining the relevant principles than to use shorthand expressions of uncer-
tain or even incorrect meaning.
1984]
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of the "enhanced injury" concept.23
The terms "crashworthiness" 24 and "second collision ' 25 are the product
of automobile litigation.26 Many cases involving passenger cars, vans, 27
trucks, 28 motorcycles, 2 9 tank cars, 30 school buses,3 1 snowmobiles, 32 air-
planes,33 boats,34 and other means of transportation, do involve crashes or
collisions allegedly involving enhanced injuries. The concept of recovery for
enhanced injury, however, is far broader.35 Application of the concept should
not be limited to cases involving manufactured products36 or the doctrine of
Olsen v. United States, 521 F. Supp. 59, 63 (E.D. Pa. 1981), af'd mem., 688 F.2d 823 (3d Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 732 (1983).
23. See infra notes 39-46, 54-59 and accompanying text.
24. In Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 243 n.2 (2d Cir. 1981), the court said
the following about the origin and meaning of the term "crashworthiness":
"Crashworthiness" means "the protection that a passenger motor vehicle affords its pas-
sengers against personal injury or death as a result of a motor vehicle accident." 15
U.S.C. § 1901(14). Coincidentally, the Caiazzos' reconstruction expert, William Steig-
litz, is credited with coining the term "crashworthiness" in a paper he presented at the
Institute of Aeronautical Sciences in 1950.
25. This term was used in the landmark decision Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d
495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968), because the court perceived that such enhanced injury vehicular accidents
were usually "caused by the so-called 'second collision' of the passenger with the interior part of
the automobile."
26. That many of the leading cases involve automobile accidents is not surprising. In Larsen
v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502 n.4 (8th Cir. 1968), the court commented about the
frequency of such accidents:
National Safety Council, Accident Facts 40 (1966 ed.) reports: In 1965 motor vehicle
accidents caused 49,000 deaths, 1.8 million disabling injuries. In automobile accidents
since the advent of the horseless carriage up to the end of 1965, 1.5 million people have
been killed in the United States. In 1966 the annual toll of those killed in automobile
accidents rose to 52,500 and 1.9 million suffered disabling injuries.
27. See, e.g., Seese v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 648 F.2d 833 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
867 (1981); Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 647 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1981); Dreisonstok v. Volks-
wagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974); General Motors Corp. v. Lahocki, 286 Md. 714,
410 A.2d 1039 (1980); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975).
28. See, e.g., Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1977); Wooten v. White
Trucks, 514 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1975); Vizzini v. Ford Motor Co., 72 F.R.D. 132 (E.D. Pa. 1976);
Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972); Wernimont
v. International Harvester Corp., 309 N.W.2d 137 (Iowa Ct. App. 1981).
29. E.g., Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 151, 305 N.E.2d 769, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1973).
30. E.g., Rucker v. Norfolk & W. Ry, 77 Ill. 2d 434, 396 N.E.2d 534 (1979).
31. In Li Puma v. Rockland Bus Lines, Inc., 81 Misc. 2d 988, 367 N.Y.S.2d 149 (1975), the
court held that there was a genuine issue of fact regarding whether General Motors was liable for
injuries allegedly enhanced when the bus it manufactured was struck by a freight train.
32. E.g., Smith v. Ariens Co., 375 Mass. 620, 377 N.E.2d 954 (1978).
33. E.g., Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1976); Trust Corp. of Mont.
v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 506 F. Supp. 1093 (D. Mont. 1981); McGee v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 82 Cal.
App. 3d 1005, 147 Cal. Rptr. 694 (1978); Cousins v. Instrument Flyers, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 336, 396
N.Y.S.2d 655 (1977); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322 (1978); Duncan v.
Cessna Aircraft Co., 632 S.W.2d 375 (rex. Civ. App. 1982). See also Note, The Crashworthiness
Doctrine and the Allocation of Risks in Commercial Aviation, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1581 (1979).
34. E.g., Hebert v. Vice, 413 So. 2d 342 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
35. See Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 504 (8th Cir. 1968).
36. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A only applies to "sellers" engaged in the business of
"selling" products. Telephone companies, electric companies and other designers and installers of
utility poles and power lines installed on and over public streets often are not involved in "selling"
such objects. Such nonseller entities should also be charged with a duty to design and maintain
such publicly located objects in a safe condition. See Bernier v. Boston Edison Co., 380 Mass.
[Vol. 62
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strict liability in tort.37 The theory should be applied to any situation in which
an object or conduct does not cause contact, but wrongfully causes the damage
from the contact 38 to be greater than it would have been had a deficiency in
the object or conduct not existed.
The terms "crashworthiness" and "second collision" are not descriptive of
many nonvehicular accidents. Enhanced injuries can result when a defective
window or a pair of sunglasses shatters, rather than fractures, upon impact,39
when a beverage bottle shatters into particles, some of which enter and dam-
age the eye of the person who threw the bottle,4° when dangerously combusti-
ble wall insulation4 ' or other material 42 allows a fire to spread more
extensively or to give off noxious fumes, when clothing or other fabrics bum
rapidly rather than slowly,43 when a rigid utility pole44 or an exposed electri-
372,403 N.E.2d 391 (1980) (electric company that owned, designed and controlled light poles had
duty to design against reasonably foreseeable risks related to environment in which poles used).
37. In Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 503 n.5 (8th Cir. 1968), the court recog-
nized that an enhanced injury recovery "can rest.. . on general negligence principles." See also
Baumgardner v. American Motors Corp., 83 Wash. 2d 751, 757-58, 522 P.2d 829, 833 (1974).
38. The doctrine is also applicable when there is no collision but when there is "movement"
within the vehicle. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
39. Eg., Filler v. Rayex Corp., 435 F.2d 336 (7th Cir. 1970) (sunglasses). While the court did
not utilize "enhanced injury" terminology in resolving Filler, the same court subsequently recog-
nized that the Filler accident involved an enhanced injury claim. Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565
F.2d 104, 108 (7th Cir. 1977).
40. See, eag., Venezia v. Miller Brewing Co., 626 F.2d 188 (1st Cir. 1980). In Venezia the
court recognized that the plaintiff's claim was for an "enhanced injury" ("so-called second colli-
sion"). Id at 190. The court determined, however, that the defendant's duty to manufacture a
reasonably safe container did not include the responsibility of designing a beer bottle that would
not shatter when thrown against a pole. Id. at 190-91.
41. In such a case, the fire might be caused by faulty electrical parts or by a fuel leak. Even if
he negligently caused the fire, an owner of a vessel, commercial building, or a home has a right to
expect that wall or bulkhead insulation will not give off noxious fumes or lead to unduly rapid
flame spread when the fire contacts the insulation. See Consent Order to Cease and Desist, In re
Society of the Plastics Industry, Inc. (FTC File No. 7323040) (fire spread characteristics of foamed
plastic material).
42. See, e.g., Hentschel v. Baby Bathinette Corp., 215 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1954) (fire broke out
in bathroom and ignited supports of bathinette). If the same case were litigated today, the Second
Circuit in all likelihood would adopt the reasoning set out in Judge Frank's dissenting opinion.
Unlike the majority, Judge Frank anticipated the enhanced injury concepts subsequently es-
poused in Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968), and Caiazzo v. Volkswa-
genwerk, A.G., 647 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1981). See Hentschel v. Baby Bathinette Corp., 215 F.2d
102, 105-14 (2d Cir. 1954) (Frank, J., dissenting).
43. See Howard v. McCrory Corp., 601 F.2d 133 (4th Cir. 1979) (fatal burns suffered when
ajamas and bathrobe ignited); Raymond v. Riegel Textile Corp., 484 F.2d 1025 (1st Cir. 1973)
flannelette nightgown burst into flame within two seconds of contacting electric range grill);
Brech v. J.C. Penney Co., 532 F. Supp. 916 (D.S.D. 1982) (flannel nightgown caught fire over gas
stove); Di Maso v. Wieboldt Stores, Inc., 37 Ill. App. 3d 966, 347 N.E.2d 466 (1976) (pajama tops
caught fire while a child was playing with matches); Dye v. Kean's, 412 So. 2d 116 (La. Ct. App.
1982) (heat given off by ignited methyl ethyl ketone, and not the bum characteristics of a work
uniform, caused plaintiff's burns); Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727 (Minn. 1980)
(flannelette pajamas caught fire when a four year old was leaning over a stove); Smith v. J.C.
Penney Co., 269 Or. 643, 525 P.2d 1299 (1974) (burning coat radiated heat and emitted gases when
the wearer was exposed to a gasoline fire). Enhanced injury principles were not expressly invoked
to resolve any of the above flammable fabrics cases. In several of the cases, however, the courts
implicitly recognized the need to show enhancement over and above injuries that would have
resulted with nondefective fabrics. Howard v. McCrory Corp., 601 F.2d 133, 137 (4th Cir. 1979);
Brech v. J.C. Penney Co., 532 F. Supp. 916, 923 (D.S.D. 1982); Di Maso v. Wieboldt Stores, Inc.,
37 Ill. App. 3d at 974, 347 N.E.2d at 473; Dye v. Kean's, 412 So. 2d 116, 120 (La. Ct. App. 1982);
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cal wire45 causes more extensive damages to a person or property than if the
pole had been flexible or the wire had been concealed, or when a physician's
negligent treatment increases the extent of the injuries suffered in an earlier
accident.46
The "second collision" concept is an inartful way of describing even a
vehicular-impact enhanced injury case. A manufacturer of motor vehicles can
be held liable for enhanced injuries even if its vehicle is not involved in a crash
or collision.47 When a vehicle is involved in an impact, a passenger can suffer
an enhanced injury without "colliding" with any interior portion of the vehi-
cle. A defectively installed seat belt can fatally injure a passenger even though
the initial impact did not cause any interior collision.48 In a car with a defec-
tive door latch, fatal enhanced injuries may result when a passenger is ejected
from the vehicle without making injurious contact within the passenger com-
partment.4 9 Fuel tank cases involve bum injuries that are wholly unrelated to
any secondary impact between a person and the vehicle.50
Several courts have mechanically based important policy decisions on the
perceived vitality of the "second collision" concept.51 For the most part, those
courts have superficially compared so-called "second collision" cases to negli-
gence cases involving "concurrent" impacts by two or more negligently driven
vehicles. 52 Courts should abandon the "second collision" jargon. Enhanced
injury theory should be the product of thoughtful legal analysis and not the
Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Co., 297 N.W.2d 727, 731 (Minn. 1980). In Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co.,
494 F.2d 173, 181 (1st Cir. 1974), an enhanced injury case involving a ruptured fuel system, the
court recognized that flammable fabrics cases involve analogous enhanced injury principles.
44. Enhanced injury analysis should be applied to these and other appropriate cases even
when a power company or other entity did not manufacture the pole, road divider, or other object.
See supra note 36.
45. See Bernier v. Boston Edison Co., 380 Mass. 372, 403 N.E.2d 391 (1980).
46. E.g., Zillman v. Meadowbrook Hosp. Co., 45 A.D.2d 267, 358 N.Y.S.2d 466 (1974).
47. See Ford Motor Co. v. Zahn, 265 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1959), in which a passenger recov-
ered for the loss of an eye that was damaged when his face struck the jagged edge of a manufac-
turer-installed dashboard ashtray. The vehicle in which Zahn was riding was not involved in a
collision. Zahn's head slammed against the dashboard when the driver stopped suddenly to avoid
striking another vehicle.
48. In Fox v. Ford Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774, 778 (10th Cir. 1978), plaintiff alleged that defec-
tive seat belts themselves caused extensive abdominal injuries and spinal fractures to two rear seat
passengers. Plaintiffs alleged that the belts were assembled at an improper angle. Cf. Endicott v.
Nissan Motor Corp., 73 Cal. App. 3d 917, 922, 141 Cal. Rptr. 95, 98 (1977) (driver struck vehicle
interior when seat belt ruptured); Engberg v. Ford Motor Co., 205 N.W.2d 104, 106 (S.D. 1973)
(decedent ejected from vehicle in which seat belt found broken). See also infra note 232.
49. See Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 243 n.2 (2d Cir. 1981). In Jeng v.
Witters, 452 F. Supp. 1349, 1355 (M.D. Pa. 1978), aff'dmem., 591 F.2d 1335 (3d Cir. 1979), the
court noted that the term "second collision" was not truly descriptive of vehicular ejection cases.
50. Injuries in automobile fuel system cases are usually caused by "spread of. . . fire in the
interior of the car." Nanda v. Ford Motor Co., 509 F.2d 213, 220 (7th Cir. 1974). See infra notes
157-59 and accompanying text.
51. See Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 669 F.2d 1199, 1207-08 (8th Cir. 1982); Fox v.
Ford Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774, 787 (10th Cir. 1978); Fouche v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 103 Idaho
249, 253, 646 P.2d 1020, 1024 (1982).
52. This approach was expressly followed in Fox v. Ford Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774, 787 (10th
Cir. 1978). See infra text accompanying notes 106-10, 186-88.
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overloading of other liability concepts.5 3
B. The Nature of the Duty to Protect Against Enhanced Injury
1. The Broad Applicability of the Concept
Enhanced injury cases involve proof of the same general elements re-
quired in any tort case.54 A claimant must establish (1) that the defendant
owed a duty to the claimant, (2) that the defendant breached that duty, (3) that
the breach was a proximate cause of injury to the claimant, and (4) that the
claimant suffered damage.55
Except for the more particularized proximate cause issue common to all
such cases, enhanced injury litigation offers no unique problems. 56 Subsumed
within the enhanced injury concept are such diverse breaches of duty as those
involving fuel-powered vehicles, other types of manufactured products, utility
poles, electrical and power lines, other publicly located objects, and physi-
cians' services. Each object or type of conduct, moreover, may be governed by
separate and distinct duties, calling for different standards of care or safety.57
The general framework of each particular duty, however, is the same in an
enhanced injury setting as it is when the same alleged breach actually causes
an underlying accident. For example, a product manufacturer's duty to make
a reasonably safe product applies with equal force to both accident prevention
and to the minimization of injuries resulting from foreseeable accidents in-
volving its product.58 In a products liability case for enhanced injuries, the
53. Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 246 (2d Cir. 1981); Huddell v. Levin,
537 F.2d 726, 742 (3d Cir. 1976).
54. Baumgardner v. American Motors, 83 Wash. 2d 751,758-59, 522 P.2d 829, 833-34 (1974);
Lee v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 1982-1983 PROD. LiAB. REP. (CCH) 9399, at 22,700 (Okla.
1982) (motion for rehearing pending).
55. See Ward v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 450 F.2d 1176, 1181 (5th Cir. 1971); W. PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS § 30 (4th ed. 1971).
56. Lee v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 1982-1983 PROD. LLAn. REP. (CCH) 1 9399, at 22,700
(Okla. 1982) (motion for rehearing pending); see also Knippen v. Ford Motor Co., 546 F.2d 993,
1000 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
57. Courts have imposed different standards relating to the following objects:
(1) "Products" sold by manufacturers must not be defective. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A (1965).
(2) Electric companies, utilities, and other energy suppliers of high voltage energy have been
held to a more stringent standard of care than normal businesses. See, e.g., Dunnaway v. Du-
quesne Light Co., 423 F.2d 66,69 n.2 (3d Cir. 1970); Haberman v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 84
Ill. App. 3d 475, 479, 405 N.E.2d 830, 834 (1980); Erbes v. Union Elec. Co., 353 S.W.2d 659, 664
(Mo. 1962); Lorence v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 191 Neb. 68, 72, 214 N.W.2d 238, 240 (1974);
Black v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 56 N.J. 63, 72, 265 A.2d 129, 133 (1970); Miner v. Long
Island Lighting Co., 40 N.Y.2d 372, 378-79, 353 N.E.2d 805, 809, 386 N.Y.S.2d 842, 846 (1976);
Vannoy v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 59 Wash. 2d 623, 631-32, 369 P.2d 848, 852-53 (1962).
(3) Health care providers are held to that degree of care, skill, and learning expected of a
reasonably prudent health care provider in the same specialty. See, e.g., Brown v. Coin, 11 Cal.
3d 639, 642-43, 522 P.2d 688, 689, 114 Cal. Rptr. 128, 129 (1974); Perin v. Hayne, 210 N.W.2d 609,
615 (Iowa 1973); Kortus v. Jensen, 195 Neb. 261, 268, 237 N.W.2d 845, 850 (1976); Starnes v.
Taylor, 272 N.C. 386, 392, 158 S.E.2d 339, 343 (1968).
(4) People not held to a particularized standard are required to exercise ordinary and reason-
able care, appropriate under the circumstances, in protecting others from objects with injury caus-
ing potential. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 284, 298 (1965).
58. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968).
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plaintiff has the same burden, as in other products cases, of proving that the
manufacturer breached that duty.59
2. Scope of the Duty
Defining the scope of any duty, in the context of a particular risk, is a
legal rather than a factual matter.60 In enhanced injury litigation, that func-
tion has been undertaken most often in the context of claims against vehicle
manufacturers. Those rules should also be applied to other types of enhanced
injury cases.61
The duty involved in enhanced injury litigation is conceptually simple.62
Manufacturers63 and, in other judicially recognized situations,64 nonmanufac-
turers, have a duty to take reasonable steps to minimize the injury-producing
effects of contact with their products, objects, and conduct.65 Clearly, the duty
is not absolute.66 While courts uniformly have recognized the relative nature
of the obligation, they have had difficulty in defining the breadth of the duty.67
In every fully litigated enhanced injury case, the court concerns itself with
the duty issue on two distinct occasions. At the outset of the trial, the court
performs the threshold task of determining whether, as a matter of law, the
plaintiff has alleged a claim within the ambit of enhanced injury theory. 68 In
deciding whether the claimant has stated a viable claim, the court's focus on
the duty issue is often narrow and exclusionary. Even when accidents involve
colorable allegations of both unsafe conditions and enhanced injuries, courts
have determined that defendants had no duty to protect against certain types
of harm.69
In automobile cases, courts have recognized that manufacturers do not
59. Id. at 502.
60. Id. at 498; Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 734 (3d Cir. 1976); Dreisonstok v. Volkswa-
genwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1069 (4th Cir. 1974); Yetter v. Rajeski, 364 F. Supp. 105, 108
(D.NJ. 1973); Kahn v. Chrysler Corp., 221 F. Supp. 677, 678 (S.D. Tex. 1963); Hatch v. Ford
Motor Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 393, 397, 329 P.2d 605, 607 (1958).
61. In Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 504 (8th Cir. 1968), the court empha-
sized that it had not "singled out" the automobile industry for "special adverse treatment.' In
stating that its holding applied to "all manufacturers," the court failed to recognize that the appli-
cation of enhanced injury theory was not so limited, But see supra notes 36-46 and accompanying
text.
62. Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 245 (2d Cir. 1981).
63. In Barris v. Bob's Drag Chutes & Safety Equip. Inc., 685 F.2d 94, 100 n.8 (3d Cir. 1982),
the court erroneously held that enhanced injury theory should not be applied in products liability
cases involving manufacturers of component parts. See supra notes 36-37, 61.
64. See infra notes 66-83 and accompanying text.
65. Calazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 245 (2d Cir. 1981); Dreisonstok v.
Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1071 (4th Cir. 1974); Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391
F.2d 495, 503 (8th Cir. 1968).
66. Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 270 (2d Cir. 1981); Larsen v. General
Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 503 (8th Cir. 1968); Bolin v. Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 151, 157, 305
N.E.2d 769, 772, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644, 649 (1973).
67. See, e.g., Alexander v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 346 F. Supp. 320, 327 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
See also infra note 75.
68. Huddel v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 734-35 (3d Cir. 1976). See also supra note 60 and accom-
panying text.
69. See infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
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have a duty to produce "crash proof" vehicles.70 In that vein, courts have
stated that manufacturers do not have to make vehicles that "float on
water,"' 71 that have the "strength and crash-damage resistance features of an
M-2 Army tank,"72 that would withstand a "head-on collision with a large
truck at high speed,"73 or that would survive an impact with "a 114-ton loco-
motive engine traveling at the rate of 45 miles per hour."74 In other cases,
courts have focused on the remote relationship between the accident and the
intended use of the product and determined that a defendant owed no duty.75
70. Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 247 (2d Cir. 1981); Dreisonstok v.
Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1070 (4th Cir. 1974); Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391
F.2d 495, 503 (8th Cir. 1968). Seealso Fox v. Ford Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774,782 (10th Cir. 1978);
Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 735 (3d Cir. 1976); Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d
1270, 1276 (8th Cir. 1972); Rutherford v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 60 Mich. App. 392, 395, 231
N.W.2d 413, 414 (1975); Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 513 P.2d 268, 274
(Mont. 1973). On the other hand, courts have recognized that manufacturers must provide "more
than merely a movable platform capable of transporting passengers from one point to another."
E.g., Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064, 1073 (E.D. Pa. 1969). A vehicle's roof,
moreover, should provide "more than merely protection against the rain." Id. See also Sours v.
General Motors Corp., 717 F.2d 1511, 1514 (6th Cir. 1983).
71. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968); see also Dyson v.
General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064, 1073 (E.D. Pa. 1969). In Larsen the court qualified its
statement by saying that a manufacturer did not have a duty to manufacture a vehicle with flota-
tion capability "under the present state of the art." Larsen, 391 F.2d at 502. Cf. Wooten v. White
Trucks, 514 F.2d 634, 636 (5th Cir. 1975) (Larsen "may indeed require consideration of the cars'
flotation capability"). In Wooten the court critically referred to "the Larsen-induced spectre of
one approved automobile design resembling nothing so much as a $100,000 amphibious tank."
Id
72. Roberts v. May, 41 Colo. App. 82, 85, 583 P.2d 305, 308 (1978).
73. Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1073 (4th Cir. 1974); Dyson v.
General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064, 1073 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
74. Alexander v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 346 F. Supp. 320, 327 (W.D.N.C. 1971). In Alex-
ander the district court, applying North Carolina law, "rejected the Larsen rule" in its entirety and
indicated that, "if the American people are to travel in Sherman tanks," Congress was the author-ity that should create such a cause of action. Id. Cf. Li Puma v. County of Rockland, 81 Misc. 2d
988, 991, 367 N.Y.S.2d 149, 152-53 (1975) (jury issue whether alleged defects in school bus, struck
by freight train weighing in excess of 4,000 tons, caused enhanced injuries). The mere fact that the
impacting vehicle is a locomotive is not dispositive. In resolving the threshold duty issue, the
court must consider all of the circumstances surrounding an accident. See infra note 128.
75. See Schneider v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 401 F.2d 549, 558 (8th Cir. 1968) (denying re-
covery to nonoccupant who, when bending down over an opened vent window of an automobile,
hit his eye on a sharp corner of the glass); Kahn v. Chrysler Corp., 221 F. Supp. 677, 679 (S.D.
Tex. 1963) (manufacturer owed no duty to seven year old bicyclist who drove into the allegedly
sharp, elongated rear fins that protruded behind the body of the vehicle); Hatch v. Ford Motor
Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 393, 397, 329 P.2d 605, 608 (1958) (manufacturer owed no duty to six year
old child who walked into parked car's radiator ornament).
The "parked car" decisions in Schneider, Hatch, and Kahn have been criticized. In Knippen
v. Ford Motor Co., 546 F.2d 993, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (motorcyclist's claim that injuries en-
hanced by contact with sharply pointed projection on impacting sedan properly submitted to
jury), the court, after distinguishing the "parked car" cases, questioned the vitality of those
decisions:
Both Hatch and Kahn were decided before their respective jurisdictions adopted the
Larsen rule. See Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 104 Cal Rptr. 433, 501
P.2d 1153 (1972) (en banc); Turner v. General Motors Corp., [514 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1974)]. Whatever support those cases may previously have offered to Ford's posi-
tion their continuing validity is dubious.
In Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270, 1276 n.5 (8th Cir. 1972) (motorcycle
passenger's claim that unshielded metal flanges on wheel cover of colliding sedan enhanced in-
jury), the court disagreed with the "no duty" determinations in Hatch and Schneider:
The difficulty is that "foreseeability" is a hazardous term to define in the abstract and,
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Similar case-by-case reasoning should be employed in any enhanced injury
case in which the accident is so devastating, remote, or bizarre that it is beyond
both the "intended use" 76 of the product and the "probable ancillary conse-
quences of normal use."77
While it is an important factor, the mere foreseeability of injury-produc-
ing contact will not justify creation of a duty to prevent resultant harm. As the
Fourth Circuit recognized in Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, .4. G. :78
The mere fact, however, that automobile collisions are frequent
enough to be foreseeable is not sufficient in and of itself to create a
duty on the part of the manufacturer to design its car to withstand
such collisions under any circumstances. Foreseeability, it has been
many times repeated, is not to be equated with duty; it is, after all,
but one factor, albeit an important one, to be weighed in determining
the issue of duty. Were foreseeability of collision the absolute litmus
test for establishing a duty on the part of the car manufacturer, the
obligation of the manufacturer to design a crash-proof car would be
absolute, a result that Larsen itself specifically repudiates. After all,
"[N]early every accident situation, [involving an automobile] no mat-
ter how bizarre, is 'foreseeable' if only because in the last fifty years
drivers have discovered just about every conceivable way of wreck-
ing an automobile."79
like so many other doctrines, must turn on the judgmental process. Interesting contrasts
may be seen in the findings of "no duty" rendered in Hatch and Schneider. The Schnei-
der panel implied that a sharp protruding ornament like a radiator cap (the facts of
Hatch) might have been reasonably foreseeable as creating a risk of harm. . .Generally
whether a duty exists is a question of law, yet when a difficult determination depends on
policy values underlying the "common affairs of life," it is generally thought that the jury
is the best deviner [sic] of such values . . . . Under such a guideline perhaps the
mechanics of the foreseeability test would be better left to the jurors' decision.
Id. (citations omitted).
In Passwaters the court also recognized that RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395 com-
ment i (1965), and 49 C.F.R. § 571.21 (1971), supported its approach. Passwaters, 454 F.2d at
1275 nn.2, 4. See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 281 comment c (1965); Note, The,4utomo-
bile Manufacturer's Liability to Pedestriansfor Exterior Design: New Dimensions in "Crashworthi-
ness," 71 MICH. L. Rav. 1654, 1669 (1973). Washington's new product liability actions statute,
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 7.72.010(5) (1983), specifically recognizes that bystanders as well as
product users may recover damages if an unsafe product causes injury.
76. Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 247 (2d Cir. 1981); Venezia v. Miller
Brewing Co., 626 F.2d 188, 191 (1st Cir. 1980); Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 740 (3d Cir. 1976),
Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1071 (4th Cir. 1974); Larsen v. General
Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 594, 502 (8th Cir. 1968).
77. Venezia v. Miller Brewing Co., 626 F.2d 188, 191 (1st Cir. 1980) (no duty to manufacture
beer bottle that will not shatter when thrown against pole).
78. 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974).
79. Id at 1070. It would be unreasonable to require a manufacturer to protect against every
conceivable accident. Nader & Page, Automobile Design and the JudicialProcess, 55 CAL. L. REV.
645, 661-62 (1967). It is necessary to distinguish between "intended use" and foreseeability:
Plaintiff again, as he did in his warranty argument, attempts to expand the scope of the
"intended" use concept by resort to the familiar, and sometimes misleading, rubric of
"foreseeability." But reliance on such generality is of limited assistance, for "[iln a sense,
in retrospect almost nothing is unforeseeable." Green v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.,
485 F.2d 430, 438 (6th Cir. 1973) (quoting Mieher v. Brown, 54 Inl. 2d 539, 301 N.E.2d
307 (III. 1973)); see also [W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS] § 43, p. 267-
68. One with the time and imagination and aided by hindsight no doubt can conjure up
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Whether a duty exists is "ultimately a question of fairness." o8 0 In routine
cases, the duty issue is not difficult.8 1 Many enhanced injuries clearly involve
the broadly defined duty to take reasonable steps to protect against post-con-
tact harm. In those cases, the primary issues involve the alleged breach of that
duty and proximate causation. If the circumstances surrounding an accident
are unusual, however, a court must make a "delicate policy judgment" 8 2 when
determining whether a duty exists. This legal determination has a significant
subjective component:
It all depends upon what factors in the evidence a court is willing to
isolate and emphasize for the purpose of making this decision, which
process in turn depends pretty much on what outcome the court
wishes to achieve or thinks to be politic. This factor in the judgment
process, in turn, is not usually a matter of conscious choice but may
be a function of the judge's accumulated experience in and observa-
tions of the world he lives in.8 3
The trial court must again evaluate the duty issue at the time the case is to
be submitted to the trier of fact.84 At this stage of the litigation, the court
performs an explanatory,85 rather than an exclusionary, function. In nonjury
cases, this process is formally performed when the court files its conclusions of
law. In a jury case, the court's jury instructions describe, in a neutral manner,
the scope of the duty to protect against enhanced injuries. The appendix to
this Article sets out jury instructions and a verdict form for an illustrative en-
all sorts of arguably "foreseeable" misuses of a variety of otherwise reasonable safe
products.
Venezia v. Miller Brewing Co., 626 F.2d 188, 191 (1st Cir. 1980).
As the court recognized in Yetter v. Rajeski, 364 F. Supp. 105, 108 (D.N.J. 1973):
It is obvious, of course, that automobiles are unhappily and almost continuously collid-
ing with other motor vehicles, with trees, with culverts, with locomotives, and with every
imaginable type of object, either moving or fixed; and they are, indeed, driven off
bridges, driven into water, and driven over cliffs; they are, in fact, involved in collisions
of limitless variety.
80. Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1070 n.9 (4th Cir. 1974); Goldberg
v. Housing Auth., 38 N.J. 578, 583, 186 A.2d 291, 293 (1962).
81. Wells v. City of Vancouver, 77 Wash. 2d 800, 808, 467 P.2d 292, 298 (1980) (Finley, J.,
concurring).
82. Raymond v. Paradise Unified School Dist., 218 Cal. App. 2d 1, 8, 31 CaL Rptr. 847, 851-
52 (1963). In Raymond the court said the following about its analytic framework:
The social utility of the activity out of which the injury arises, compared with the risks
involved in its conduct; the kind of person with whom the actor is dealing; the workabil-
ity of a rule of care, especially in terms of the parties' relative ability to adopt practical
means of preventing injury; the relative ability of the parties to bear the financial burden
of injury and the availability of means by which the loss may be shifted or spread; the
body of statutes and judicial precedents which color the parties' relationship; the prophy-
lactic effect of a rule of liability; in the case of a public agency defendant, the extent of its
powers, the role imposed upon it by law and the limitations imposed upon it by budget;
and finally, the moral imperatives which judges share with their fellow citizens--such
are the factors which play a role in the determination of duty.
Id.
83. Gregory, Proximate Cause in Negligence-A Retreatfrom "Rationalization," 6 U. CIi. L.
REv. 36, 50 (1938).
84. Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 734 (3d Cir. 1976).
85. Id
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hanced injury case.86
Most of the general legal standards governing ordinary products liability
or negligence cases are applicable to enhanced injury litigation.87 Resolution
of an enhanced injury case, however, involves additional, particularized stan-
dards that define the scope of this duty. Several of the additional standards
are cautionary. Before evaluating a product or other object, the trier of fact
should expressly consider the object's inherent characteristics, s" its price,8 9
and the circumstances of the accident. 90 The trier must also recognize that a
claimant can only recover for that portion of the damages over and above that
which would probably have occurred absent the unsafe condition. 91
II. PROVING AN ENHANCED INJURY CLAIM
Al. The Prima Facie Case
Judicial decisions that recognize a right of recovery have subscribed 92 to
the following statement in Larsen v. General Motors Corp. 93 as framing the
conceptual parameters of recovery:
Any design defect not causing the accident would not subject the
manufacturer to liability for the entire damage, but the manufacturer
should be liable for that portion of the damage or injury caused by
the defective design over and above the damage or injury that proba-
bly would have occurred as a result of the impact or collision absent
the defective design.94
The courts have, nevertheless, disagreed regarding the nature and relative
distinctiveness of enhanced injury theory. At one extreme, courts have charac-
86. See infra notes 248-85 and accompanying text.
87. Lee v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 1982-1983 PROD. LiAB. REP. (CCH) 9399, at 22,700
(Okla. 1982) (motion for rehearing pending).
88. Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1072-73 (4th Cir. 1974). See also
Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 740-41 (3d Cir. 1976); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86
Wash. 2d 145, 154, 542 P.2d 774, 779 (1975). Convertibles, vans, and all objects must be evaluated
in terms of their own inherent characteristics. Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064,
1073 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 154, 542 P.2d 774, 779
(1975).
89. Fox v. Ford Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774, 783 (10th Cir. 1978); Wooten v. White Trucks, 514
F.2d 634, 636 (5th Cir. 1975); Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1072-73 (4th
Cir. 1974); Jeng v. Witters, 452 F. Supp. 1349, 1356 (M.D. Pa. 1978), a'dmer., 591 F.2d 1335 (3d
Cir. 1979); Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 219, 321 A.2d 737, 746 (1974); Seat-
tle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 154, 542 P.2d 774, 779 (1975).
90. See infra note 128.
91. Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 740 (3d Cir. 1976); Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391
F.2d 495, 503 (8th Cir. 1968); Baumgardner v. American Motors, 83 Wash. 2d 751, 755, 522 P.2d
829, 832 (1974). See also infra note 92.
92. Despite significant disagreements about matters of proof, all of the leading decisions have
adopted the core statement in Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968),
concerning the extent of enhanced injury liability. Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 647 F.2d
241, 250 n.16 (2d Cir. 1981); Lee v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 1982-1983 PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH)
9399, at 22,701-02 (Okla. 1982) (motion for rehearing pending).
93. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
94. Id at 503.
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terized and treated the theory as being sui generis.95 At the other extreme,
courts have concluded that "orthodox tort principles" governing other types of
tort cases can be routinely applied to enhanced injury cases.96 The disagree-
ment is of more than academic interest. The two 97 different threshold charac-
terizations have produced, or been used to justify, markedly different
approaches to the elements of a prima facie enhanced injury case, the burden
of proof, and the requirements regarding specificity of proof.
In reality, enhanced injury theory is neither sui generis nor the subject for
a mechanical application of other tort formulas. Enhanced injury litigation
presents no unique problems in proving an alleged breach of duty, but does
require a particularized treatment of the proximate cause issue.98 Enhanced
injury cases involve events that, according to common experience, often result
in injuries even if a product or object is reasonably designed to minimize the
effects of an accident.99 For that reason, in enhanced injury litigation, the
proximate cause issue should be addressed by the court as two separate, but
related, sub-issues involving the occurrence and the extent of enhancement. 100
In an enhanced injury case, the claimant has the burden of proving each
of the following three elements by a preponderance of the evidence:
(1) A breach of a duty owed to the claimant;' 01
(2) Proof that the breach caused an enhancement of damage over and
above what would otherwise have occurred; 10 2
(3) Proof of the extent to which the damage was enhanced as a result of
the breach of duty.'0 3
The third element has been a source of controversy. The Second Circuit's
decision in Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A. G. 104 and other decisions faithful to
the theoretical underpinnings of enhanced injury theory have required proof
of the extent of enhancement as part of a claimant's prima facie case.105 If a
95. Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 742 (3d Cir. 1976).
96. Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 669 F.2d 1199, 1207 (8th Cir. 1982); Fox v. Ford
Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774, 787 (10th Cir. 1978).
97. California's generally unique approach to products liability litigation places it outside
both conceptual frameworks. The California courts apply a two-tier burden of proof model in
both ordinary products cases and in enhanced injury cases. Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d
413, 431-32, 573 P.2d 443, 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 237 (1978) (ordinary products liability case);
Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 746, 575 P.2d 1162, 1175, 144. Cal. Rptr. 380, 393
(1978) (enhanced injury case).
98. Knippen v. Ford Motor Co., 546 F.2d 993, 1000 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Lee v. Volkswagen
of Am., Inc., 1982-1983 PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 9399, at 22,700-01 (Okla. 1982) (motion for
rehearing pending).
99. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 503 (8th Cir. 1968).
100. Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 250-51 (2d Cir. 1981).
101. A plaintiff must prove a breach of duty to prevail in any tort case. W. PROSSER, supra
note 55, at 143.
102. Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 250-51 (2d Cir. 1981); Larsen v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 503 (8th Cir. 1968). See also infra note 105.
103. See supra note 102.
104. 647 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1981).
105. See Curtis v. General Motors Corp., 649 F.2d 808, 813 (10th Cir. 1981); Bauman v.
Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 621 F.2d 230, 235 (6th Cir. 1980); Stonehocker v. General Motors Corp.,
587 F.2d 151, 158 (4th Cir. 1978); Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 742 (3d Cir. 1976); Dreisonstok
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defendant's liability is to be limited to those damages "over and above" those
which would have occurred absent the breach of duty, a claimant must be
required to offer such proof.
In Fox v. Ford Motor Co. 106 the Tenth Circuit, ostensibly for doctrinal
reasons, held that the third element was not a requisite element of a claimant's
prima facie case.107 In Fox the court determined that a claimant need only
prove a breach of duty and that the breach was a proximate cause of enhanced
injury.10 8 According to Fox, under "orthodox doctrines of joint liability of
concurrent tortfeasors,"'10 9 a defendant causing an enhanced injury would be
liable for the entirety of the claimant's damage unless the defendant could
both establish that the overall injuries were legally "divisible" and then prove
the amount of enhancement. 110 As the Eighth Circuit's decision in Mitchell v.
Volkswagenwerk, A. G. 111 implies, however, the real concern of the minority of
courts following the Fox approach is not a doctrinal one. In Mitchell the court
sacrificed conceptual clarity and the clear procedural implications of Larsen v.
General Motors Corp. because of its fear that, as a practical matter, such an
element of proof would "relegate victims to an almost hopeless state of never
being able to succeed."' 112
In Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A. G. 113 the Second Circuit recognized
that, depending on the type of the alleged enhancement, a claimant's burden
in proving enhancement will be "heavy in some instances and perhaps impos-
sible in others." 114 Nevertheless, that burden does not "erode""l S Larsen or
v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1076 (4th Cir. 1974); Jeng. v. Witters, 452 F. Supp. 1349,
1360 (M.D. Pa. 1978), afdmen , 591 F.2d 1335 (3d Cir. 1979); Wernimont v. International Har-
vester Corp., 309 N.W.2d 137, 140-41 (Iowa Ct. App. 1981); Lee v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 1982-
1983 PROD. LLAB. REP. (CCII) 1 9399, at 22,704 (Okla. 1982) (motion for rehearing pending);
Baumgardner v. American Motors, 83 Wash. 2d 751, 758-59, 522 P.2d 829, "833-34 (1974).
106. 575 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1978).
107. Id at 787-88.
108. Id In Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 669 F.2d 1199 (8th Cir. 1982), the court de-
fined this approach to the burden of proof as follows: "[T]he plaintiff's burden of proof should be
deemed satisfied against the manufacturer if it is shown that the design defect was a substantial
factor inproducing damages over and above those which were probably caused as a result of the
original impact or collision." Id. at 1206 (emphasis added). The phrase "substantial factor" is
nothing more than the stock language set out in the general proximate cause instruction given by
the federal courts in ordinary tort cases. See 3 E. DEvrrr & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRAC-
TICE AND INsTRUCTIONS § 80.18 (1977).
109. Fox, 575 F.2d at 787. See also Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 669 F.2d 1199, 1207
(8th Cir. 1982). Other courts have expressly rejected this approach. Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk,
A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 246 (2d Cir. 1981); Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 738 (3d Cir. 1976); Lee v.
Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 1982-1983 PROD. LiAB. REP. (CCH) 9399, at 22,701-02 (Okla. 1982)
(motion for rehearing pending).
110. Fox, 575 F.2d at 787.
111. 669 F.2d 1199 (8th Cir. 1982).
112. Id at 1204.
113. 647 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1981).
114. Id at 251. Plaintiffs, moreover, must address complex issues in many other types of
litigation. See Knippen v. Ford Motor Co., 546 F.2d 993, 1000 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Turner v.
General Motors Corp., 514 S.W.2d 497, 506 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Baumgardner v. American
Motors, 83 Wash. 2d 751, 758, 522 P.2d 829, 833 (1974); Arbet v. Gussarson, 66 Wis. 2d 551, 561-
62, 225 N.W.2d 431, 438 (1975).
115. Mitchell, 669 F.2d at 1208.
[Vol. 62
ENHANCED INJURY
result in the "complete exoneration of the negligent manufacturer":11 6
Where it is impossible, however, the plaintiff has merely failed to
establish his prima facie case, i.e., that it is more probable than not
that the alleged defect aggravated or enhanced the injuries resulting
from the initial collision. Moreover, in those instances in which the
plaintiff cannot offer any evidence as to what would have occurred
but for the alleged defect, the plaintiff has not established the fact of
enhancement at all. 17
The concern in Fox and Mitchell that meritorious claimants should prevail is a
legitimate one."i8 The proper way to promote that goal, however, is to formu-
late realistic and practicable proof requirements. Establishing reasonable re-
quirements for the method and quantum of proof, and not employing the
strained and faulty' 19 conceptual analysis used in Fox and Mitchell, is the
116. Id at 1207-08.
117. Caiazzo, 647 F.2d at 251.
118. Equally legitimate is the concern that manufacturers receive fair treatment. In Dawson v.
Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 962-63 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981), the court
discussed the problems faced by even the most careful, safety-oriented automobile manufacturers:
Although we affirm the judgment of the district court, we do so with uneasiness
regarding the consequences of our decision and of the decisions of other courts through-
out the country in cases of this kind ....
[Tlhe states. . . delegate to the triers of fact in civil cases arising out of automobile
accidents the power to determine whether a particular product conforms to such stan-
dards ....
The result of such arrangement is that while the jury found Chrysler liable for not
producing a rigid enough vehicular frame, a factfinder in another case might well hold
the manufacturer liable for producing a frame that is too rigid. Yet, as pointed out at
trial, in certain types of accidents-head-on collisions-it is desirable to have a car
designed to collapse upon impact because the deformation would absorb much of the
shock of the collision, and divert the force of deceleration away from the vehicle's pas-
sengers. In effect, this permits individual juries applying varying laws in different juris-
dictions to set nationwide automobile safety standards and to impose on automobile
manufacturers conflicting requirements. It would be difficult for members of the indus-
try to alter their design and production behavior in response to jury verdicts in such
cases, because their response might well be at variance with what some other jury de-
cides is a defective design. Under these circumstances, the law imposes on the industry
the responsibility of insuring vast numbers of persons involved in automobile accidents.
Equally serious is the impact on other national social and economic goals of the
existing case-by-case system of establishing automobile safety requirements. As we have
become more dependent on foreign sources of energy, and as the price of that energy has
increased, the attention of the federal government has been drawn to a search to find
alternative supplies and the means of conserving energy. More recently, the domestic
automobile industry has been struggling to compete with foreign manufacturers which
have stressed smaller, more fuel-efficient cars. Yet, during this same period, Congress
has permitted a system of regulation by ad hoe adjudications under which a jury can
hold an automobile manufacturer culpable for not producing a car that is considerably
heavier, and likely to have less fuel efficiency.
See also Caiazzo, 647 F.2d at 247 n. 12. That different juries may arrive at conflicting conclusions
is a "hazard" that every national manufacturer necessarily encounters. Turner v. General Motors
Corp., 514 S.W.2d 497, 506 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
119. In Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976), the court discussed the inapplicability
of the doctrine of joint liability of concurrent tortfeasors in enhanced injury cases:
We do not perceive the analysis of "second collision" or "enhanced injury" cases to track
the legal lore surrounding concurrent tortfeasor actions which, in the concurrence's for-
mulation, "have combined contemporaneously to cause the injuries." . . . "Second colli-
sion" cases do not implicate "clearly established double fault" for the same occurrence.
Clearly, if the theoretical underpinnings for liability in this case are to be given effect,
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manner in which a person with a meritorious claim should be protected.
B. Problems of Proof
1. Method of Proof
In most enhanced injury cases, a substantial part of the claimant's case
necessarily will be in the form of expert testimony.120 Expert testimony is not
required in the rare cases that involve design and causation issues within the
common knowledge and experience of laymen.121 In determining whether ex-
pert guidance'22 is necessary, the trial court should analyze independently
Levin may be held liable for all injuries, but General Motors may only be held liable for
"enhanced injuries." Analogies to concurrent actions combining to cause a single impact
are simply not applicable. Similarly, analogies to chain collisions are not applicable
where, as here, one party is sued on a fault theory for the collision and the other party is
sued on the theory of strict liability for the "second collision."
Id at 738 (citations omitted).
The joint liability-concurrent tortfeasors principles enunciated in Fox v. Ford Motor Co,, 575
F.2d 774, 787 (10th Cir. 1978), and Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 669 F.2d 1199, 1203-09
(8th Cir. 1982), are those set out in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 433A, 433B, 434, 435
(1965). Those Restatement sections, however, do not indicate that their substantive provisions
should be applied to enhanced injury cases. The term "second collision" has caused, or been used
to justify, such a mechanical application ofjoint liability-concurrent tortfeasors principles. Mitch-
ell, 669 F.2d at 1203; Fox, 575 F.2d at 781. In fact, enhanced injury cases do not involve two
separate "accidents" or "collisions." Unlike a multiple car accident, an automobile accident caus-
ing enhanced injuries involves one impact and the failure of the impacted object to offer reason-
able protection against that impact. Characterizing the protective issue as a "second collision" is
conceptually imprecise. The injured party's contact with the interior of the vehicle, or with some
other injury-causing instrumentality, is not analogous to the impact of a second distinct entity
upon the injured party's vehicle. The Mitchell and Fox courts failed to recognize, moreover, that
doctrine is merely an instrument of policy. Terms such as "second collision" may be more attrac-
tive because of their brevity than they are useful as tools of comprehension. See Olsen v. United
States, 521 F. Supp. 59, 63 (E.D. Pa. 1981), aff'dmem., 688 F.2d 823 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 732 (1983). Existing doctrines should only be invoked if they reflect and promote the
core principles of the theory of liability to which they would be applied. See Caiazzo v. Volkswa-
genwerk, A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 246 (2d Cir. 1981); Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 742 (3d Cir.
1976); Lee v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 1982-1983 PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 9399, at 22,704
(Okla. 1982) (motion for rehearing pending). In applying RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 433A, 433B, 434, 435 (1965), the Mitchell and Fox decisions are inconsistent with the theoreti-
cal underpinnings of enhanced injury theory set out in Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d
495, 503 (8th Cir. 1968). See supra text accompanying note 94.
120. Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 626 F.2d 784, 788 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 918
(1981); Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 736 (3d Cir. 1976); Jeng v. Witters, 452 F. Supp. 1349,
1356 (M.D. Pa. 1978), afdmem., 591 F.2d 1335 (3d Cir. 1979).
121. As the court recognized in Lynd v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 276 Or. 341, 349, 554 P.2d 1000,
1005 (1976), expert testimony is not always required to prove a products liability case. In Fouche
v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 103 Idaho 249, 254-55, 646 P.2d 1020, 1025-26 (1982), involving alleg-
edly defective seat belts and energy-absorbing characteristics of steering column, the court held
that even difficult causal issues can be proved without the use of expert testimony. See also Smith
v. Ariens Co., 375 Mass. 620, 625, 377 N.E.2d 954, 957-58 (1978) (whether unshielded protrusion
on a snowmobile constituted a defect was within the knowledge of the jury). Although the
Supreme Court of California did not discuss the issue, Horn v. General Motors Corp., 17 Cal. 3d
359, 551 P.2d 398, 131 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1976) (horn cap flew off steering column and motorist's face
hit exposed steel prongs) was a case in which expert testimony was not needed to establish a prima
facie case. The causal relationship in Horn was "immediately apparent." Endicott v. Nissan Mo-
tor Corp., 73 Cal. App. 3d 917, 927, 141 Cal. Rptr. 95, 100 (1977).
122. The Third Circuit has recognized that expert testimony must be critically analyzed by the
trier of fact. Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 735-36 (3d Cir. 1976) ("[W]ithout intending undue
cynicism, we are aware of the realities of expert testimony.").
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each of the three requisite elements of the prima facie case.
With respect to the first element, the breach of duty issue, the same rules
governing ordinary products liability and negligence cases should be applied
in enhanced injury litigation.1 23 Expert testimony is not required if the defect,
unsafe condition, or other breach of duty is readily apparent or nontechni-
cal.' 24 When specialized guidance is required, the expert's function is, never-
theless, a limited one. Determining whether there has been a breach of duty is
a mixed question of law and fact that is reserved for the trier of fact.125 Expert
witnesses are not allowed to usurp that function by characterizing a product as
"unsafe," "unreasonably dangerous," or in terms of any other applicable legal
standard. 126 Their function properly involves only the furnishing of scientific,
technical or other specialized knowledge that will assist the trier of fact in
determining whether a defendant's product or conduct measures up to the ap-
propriate standard.' 27
An expert witness' method of addressing the breach of duty issue will
vary from case to case. In proving the first element, the expert necessarily
must consider the circumstances and severity of the particular accident. 128 De-
fendants are not required to design or protect against extraordinary accidents
of unusual circumstance or severity.129 Manufacturers and other defendants
are only obligated to take "reasonable steps in design" to minimize the injury-
producing effects of impacts. 130 In an enhanced injury case, the breach of
duty issue is not an abstract one. The trier of fact's function is to evaluate an
object's performance in the context of the particular risk that was actually
encountered.1 31
The second and third elements of a prima facie case, while conceptually
123. The duty question in enhanced injury cases is not unique. See Lee v. Volkswagen of
Am., Inc. 1982-1983 PROD. LiAB. REP. (CCH) 9399, at 22,700 (Okla. 1982) (motion for rehearing
pending). The nature of a defendant's duty will depend, however, on the type of activity in which
he is engaged. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text. The different states have, moreover,
fashioned a potpourri of different definitions of the duties for each type of activity. See, e.g.,
Seattle-First Natl Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 154, 542 P.2d 774, 779 (1975) (discussing the
states' different approaches to the "defect" requirement set out in § 402A). Courts have properly
used a particularized duty definition when discussing enhanced injury cases. See Larsen v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502-03 (8th Cir. 1968).
124. Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 735 (3d Cir. 1976). See also supra note 121.
125. See Aller v. Rodgers Mach. Mfg. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830, 840 (Iowa 1978); Wagner v.
Flightcraft, Inc., 31 Wash. App. 558, 568, 643 P.2d 906, 911 (1982).
126. See supra note 125. See also WASH. R. EvIl. 704 comment (a rule identical to FED. R.
EviD. 704) and FED. R. EvID. 704 advisory committee note.
127. See FED. R. EvID. 702.
128. As the court held in Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 740 (3d Cir. 1976): "The 'relative
severity of the impact' goes to the heart of the issue of defectiveness in terms of the 'ordinary
purposes for which the product. . . was designed ... "' See also Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk,
A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 251 (2d Cir. 1981); Stonehocker v. General Motors Corp., 587 F.2d 151, 154
(4th Cir. 1978); Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1070, 1073 (4th Cir. 1974);
Jeng v. Witters, 452 F. Supp. 1349, 1355 (M.D..Pa. 1978), affldmem., 591 F.2d 1335 (3d Cir. 1979);
Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Young, 272 Md. 201, 219, 321 A.2d 737, 747 (1974); Li Puma v.
County of Rockland, 81 Misc. 2d 988, 367 N.Y.S.2d 149 (1975).
129. Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 740 (3d Cir. 1976).
130. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 503 (8th Cir. 1968).
131. Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 740 (3d Cir. 1976).
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distinct from each other, involve common and interrelated types of proof. In
most cases, proving the "fact" and the extent of enhancement is an intricate
endeavor. To prove those elements, a claimant must prove five sequential fac-
tual matters. In proving all three elements, a claimant must present evidence
that will allow the trier of fact to perform the following six functions:
1. Determine that the defendant breached a duty owed to the
claimant; 132
2. Evaluate the full nature, extent, and consequences of the injuries ac-
tually received in the accident; 133
3. Quantify the severity of the impact imparted to both the object at
issue and to the person or property injured after impact;' 34
4. Define, with a meaningful degree of specificity, the alternative, safer
design(s) that claimant alleges the defendant should have used;' 35
5. Evaluate the full nature, extent, and consequences of the injuries, if
any, that the claimant hypothetically would have suffered in the very same
accident if the alternative, safer design had been used;136
6. Calculate in terms of a damage award the difference between the in-
juries actually suffered and those that hypothetically would have been suffered
if the alternative, safer design had been used. 137
The first and second determinations are the same breach of duty and
damage findings that a trier of fact renders in any tort case. The third and
fourth determinations provide the baseline data with which to perform the
fifth determination. In making the sixth determination, the trier of fact quan-
tifies the difference between the second and fifth determinations. The sixth
determination requires the trier both to decide whether there is a difference
and, if there is, to render a quantitative measurement of the difference. The
sixth determination establishes, subject to reduction for his own failure to mit-
igate or for comparative responsibility, 138 the claimant's damage award for his
132. For a discussion of the duty issue, see supra notes 53-89 and accompanying text.
133. This function is identical to the damage determination rendered in ordinary tort cases.
134. See supra note 128.
135. See Stonehocker v. General Motors Corp., 587 F.2d 151, 158 (4th Cir. 1978); Huddell v.
Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 740 (3d Cir. 1976); Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066,
1073-75 (4th Cir. 1974); Jeng v. Witters, 452 F. Supp. 1349, 1361 (M.D. Pa. 1978), a 'dmem., 591
F.2d 1335 (3d Cir. 1979); Yetter v. Rajeski, 364 F. Supp. 105, 109 (D.N.J. 1973). Cf. Connor v.
Skagit Corp., 99 Wash. 2d 709, 715, 664 P.2d 1208, 1212 (1983) (in ordinary products liability
cases, proof of an alternative design, while relevant to the design defect issue, is not an essential
element of proof in every case). In enhanced injury cases, a plaintiff must prove an alternative,
safer design, not in order to prove breach of duty, but to establish the causal element of his case.
136. See Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 245, 251 (2d Cir. 1981); Stone-
hocker v. General Motors Corp., 587 F.2d 151, 158 (4th Cir. 1978); Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d
726, 737 (3d Cir. 1976); Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1074 (4th Cir.
1974).
137. See Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 245 (2d Cir. 1981); Huddell v.
Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 738 (3d Cir. 1976); Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 503 (8th
Cir. 1968). In some cases, a defendant may contend that the plaintiff's proposed design, while
lessening the injuries he actually suffered, would have resulted in additional injuries of a different
type. See Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 738 (3d Cir. 1976).




Determinations one through four are not qualitatively different or more
difficult than those made in ordinary tort cases. Because they involve techni-
cal matters, however, these issues may require, or best be proved with, expert
testimony.' 3 9
2. Proving the Extent of Enhancement
There are diverse views regarding the relative difficulty of proving the
measure of enhancement. In generally characterizing the claimant's task,
courts have variously referred to his "impossible burden,"140 a "highly refined
and almost invariably difficult"' 41 process, "thorny"'142 issues, "not an insur-
mountable"'143 problem, and as "simply" involving "matters of proof."' 44
Unquestionably, making the fifth determination is the trier of fact's most diffi-
cult task in an enhanced injury case. 145 That function requires the trier to
determine hypothetically what injuries would more probably than not have
occurred if the alternative, safer design proposed by the claimant had been
used. 146
To establish a prima facie case of enhancement, a claimant must present
the baseline accident reconstruction and alternative design evidence that the
trier needs to make the fifth determination. In most cases, even if such base-
line information is proven, the trier of fact will not be able to use that data to
reconstruct a hypothetical accident that never occurred.14 7 In such cases, as
part of his prima facie case, the claimant must produce expert testimony that
embraces the ultimate 48 factual issue of the nature and extent of the damages
he would have suffered absent the breach of duty.
The claimant's burden is not impossible or unfair. 14 9 The theoretical un-
derpinnings of the enhanced injury concept create a practicable balance be-
tween the interests, of claimants and defendants. Although they involve
interrelated items of proof, the distinction between the occurrence and the ex-
tent of enhancement is important. In proving the occurrence of enhancement,
a claimant has established conclusively that his claim is meritorious. 150 Once
139. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text. The trial court can admit expert testi-
mony to aid the trier of fact even if such testimony is not a requirement of the plaintiffs case. See
FED. R. Evin. 702 and advisory committee note.
140. Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 669 F.2d 1199, 1204 (8th Cir. 1982).
141. Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 737 (3d Cir. 1976).
142. Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 245 (2d Cir. 1981).
143. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 503 (8th Cir. 1968).
144. Baumgardner v. American Motors Corp., 83 Wash. 2d 751, 759, 522 P.2d 829, 834 (1974).
145. Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 669 F.2d 1199, 1204-05 (8th Cir. 1982); Caiazzo v.
Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 245 (2d Cir. 1981).
146. See Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 737 (3d Cir. 1976).
147. Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 250 (2d Cir. 1981).
148. FED. R. EVID. 704 allows such proof. Testimony on mixed issues of law and fact should
not be allowed. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
149. Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 250 (2d Cir. 1981).
150. In establishing the occurrence of enhancement, a plaintiff has proved that the defendant
caused injuries over and above those that should have been suffered. As the court recognized in
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a claimant has adduced substantial evidence supporting such a threshold,
qualitative finding, the court will submit the claim to the trier of fact even if
the proof of the extent of enhancement is not precise or exact. 151 Triers of fact
Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 503 (8th Cir. 1968), a defendant "should be [held]
liable" in such cases. Even if the extent of enhancement is "difficult to assess," such a plaintiff
should not be "abandon[ed] ... to his dismal fate." Id In Horn v. General Motors Corp., 17
Cal. 3d 359, 369, 551 P.2d 398, 403, 131 Cal. Rptr. 78, 83 (1976), the court took a lenient approach
to the requirement that the extent, as well as the "fact," of enhancement be proved: "Having
found that plaintiff suffered aggravated injuries, the jury was under a duty to fix the amount of
damages from the evidence available."
151. This approach is not a novel one. In other areas of law, courts have recognized that, once
the "fact" of wrongful damage has been established, the plaintiff is entitled to recover even if the
amount is not susceptible to exact proof:
We have recognized a distinction between proof of the fact that damages have been
sustained and proof of the amount of those damages. If it is speculative and uncertain
whether damages have been sustained, recovery is denied. If uncertainty lies only in the
amount of damages, recovery may be had if there is a reasonable basis in the evidence
from which the amount can be inferred or approximated.
Larsen v. United Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 300 N.W.2d 281, 288 (Iowa 1981) (citations omitted).
See also Leoni v. Bemis Co., 255 N.W.2d 824, 826 (Minn. 1977); Bader v. Cerri, 96 Nev. 352, 357,
609 P.2d 314, 318 (1980); Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 80 N.J. 378, 388, 403 A.2d 902, 908 (1979);
Berley Indus., Inc. v. City of New York, 45 N.Y.2d 683, 687, 385 N.E.2d 281, 283, 412 N.Y.S.2d
589, 591 (1978); Allen v. Kleven, 306 N.W.2d 629, 636 (N.D. 1981).
In May v. Portland Jeep, Inc., 265 Or. 307, 311-12, 509 P.2d 24, 26-27 (1973), the court recog-
nized that enhanced injury cases also produce "inexact situations" that cannot be translated into
"mathematically precise awards":
From the above narration of what occurred, we believe a jury could reasonably
conclude that a major portion of plaintiffs injuries would not have occurred in the ab-
sence of the collapse of the bar. There is no way of determining, of course, what the
exact extent of plaintiff's injuries would have been had the roll bar not collapsed. How-
ever, we allow juries to make somewhat similar inexact determinations, such as the ex-
tent of pain and suffering and its value in money. We do so because we believe such
pain and suffering should be compensable, and there is no way of determining its extent
and value other than to allow the jury to use its best judgment. The only alternative in
this case is to say that plaintiff probably was additionally injured by the collapse of the
bar, but that, because we cannot determine exactly what his injuries would have been if
it had not collapsed, he cannot recover at all. This is not an acceptable alternative, and it
is usual to allow the jury to use its judgment in similar inexact situations. It was proper
to allow the jury to make its best estimate of that portion of plaintifi's injuries attributa-
ble to the collapse of the bar.
Because the trier of fact must compare what actually happened with what arguably should have
happened, resolution of an enhanced injury claim necessarily produces rough and generalized
damage determinations. "'[W]hat might have happened is rarely susceptible of proof."' Caiazzo
v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 245 (2d Cir. 1981) (quoting Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk,
A.G., 468 F. Supp. 593, 598 (E.D.N.Y. 1979)).
The mechanism for setting enhanced injury awards was described realistically by the district
court in Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 468 F. Supp. 593, 602 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'dinpart on
other grounds, 647 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1981):
The jury had to evaluate the damage evidence which it heard to form a judgment about
the distribution of physiological damage and pain and suffering as between the collision
and rollover itself and, on the other hand, the ejection from the vehicle in the course of
the rollover. None of the physiological injury and pain and suffering could be precisely
quantified, nor quantified except within very wide limits. The problem required just the
sixth sense, life-experience evaluation that has been traditionally-and gratefully-given
over to the judgment of juries.
See also Stahl v. Ford Motor Co., 64 Ill. App. 3d 919, 924, 381 N.E.2d 1211, 1215 (1978). Mathe-
matical, overly precise, or rigid proof requirements would make proof of the extent of damage
impossible. Lee v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 1982-1983 PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 9399, at 22,702
(Okla. 1982) (motion for rehearing pending). Arguments calling for such requirements should be
rejected. Id In Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 743-44 (3d Cir. 1976), the court properly defined
the nature of the plaintiff's burden of proof:
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are allowed to make similar inexact determinations in returning awards in per-
sonal injury cases involving pain and suffering, 152 in resolving wrongful death
cases in which young children's net lifetime earnings are projected,1 53 in set-
ting condemnation awards, 154 in making comparative negligence determina-
tions,155 and in business interruption and lost profits lawsuits in which the trier
hypothetically must determine what profits would have been earned absent the
defendant's wrongful conduct. 156
Abstract conclusions regarding the difficulty of proving enhancement can
be misleading. The complexity of proof varies depending on the type of injury
suffered by the claimant. Most of the reported cases involve personal injuries
suffered in vehicular accidents. Among the serious injuries suffered in those
accidents are burns, brain or spinal cord damage, and fractures or soft tissue
injuries related to inward vehicle crush or to occupant movement during vehi-
cle deceleration. Such accidents have also resulted in death from those and
other injury mechanisms.
3. Specific Types of Cases
(a) Burn injuries
When burn injuries are involved, the enhancement issue in cases involv-
ing allegedly defective fuel systems is resolved easily.1 57 Burns are clearly dis-
tinguishable from bruises, fractures, or other injuries unrelated to the failure
We are mindful of the difficulties of calculating damages in a case like this; mathemati-
cal exactitude is not required. The plaintiff, however, bears the burden of proof and it is
the responsibility of the plaintiff to provide for the jury some evidentiary and logical
basis for calculating or, at least, rationally estimating a compensatory award. "[S]heer
conjecture cannot be the basis of a jury finding."
152. In May v. Portland Jeep, Inc., 265 Or. 307, 311, 509 P.2d 24, 27 (1973), the court expressly
compared the inexact awards in enhanced injury cases to those returned for pain and suffering.
See the May excerpt set out in note 151, supra.
153. Such awards are routinely returned in states in which the estate of a decedent is entitled
to recover an award for his projected net future accumulations.
154. This analogy was made in Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 503-04 (8th
Cir. 1968).
155. Id
156. The flexibility of proof requirements in this area of law were described in V. C. Edwards
Constructing Co. v. Port of Tacoma, 83 Wash. 2d 7, 15, 514 P.2d 1381, 1386 (1973).
157. As the court recognized in Jeng v. Witters, 452 F. Supp. 1349, 1360 (M.D. Pa. 1978), af'd
men, 591 F.2d 1335 (3d Cir. 1979):
One type of second collision case in which plaintiffs have been successful is where a
defective gas tank has caused a fire and the plaintiffs injury consists mainly of bums.
See Turcotte v. Ford Motor Company, 494 F.2d 173 (lst Cir. 1974). Obviously a burn is
a much different injury than bruises or fractures which typically occur in an accident,
and separating the extent of injuries caused by the defect is not as difficult as the case
where the bruises or fractures have been made more severe because of the lack of safety
features in a car. Insurmountable problems of proof might be presented to a plaintiff in
cases where a product is clearly defective and unreasonably dangerous but the injury is
incapable of apportionment.
See also Fietzer v. Ford Motor Co., 590 F.2d 215, 218 (7th Cir. 1978) (no problem segregating fuel
fire injuries); Polk v. Ford Motor Co., 529 F.2d 259, 267 (8th Cir.) (all proven injuries occurred as
a result of the fire), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 907 (1976). Identifying the enhanced portion of fire
damage in cases involving building or flammable fabrics fires can be far more difficult. In such
cases, all of the damage, enhanced and nonenhanced, is fire damage.
19841
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
of a fuel system.'58 Invariably, a claimant's witnesses describe an alternative
fuel system that would have prevented fuel system failure, or design features
that would have allowed adequate escape time. Consequently, in a fuel system
case in which the vehicle is defective, the claimant will have no difficulty in
proving that his injuries were enhanced by the full measure of the bums
suffered. 159
(b) Brain and spinal cord injuries
Similarly, many cases involving serious brain or spinal cord injuries can
be resolved routinely. Often the central question in such cases is "how" the
injury occurred and not the more difficult issue involving "how much" of an
injury is attributable to a defect. The factual situation alleged in Mitchell v.
Volkswagenwerk, A.G. ,160 ejection of a driver through an open door,16 1 is a
common one. In Mitchell plaintiff suffered serious neurological injuries.' 62
Mitchell did not involve a quantitative segregation between inevitable injuries
and a defect-caused worsening of those injuries. 163
In such cases, a properly instructed jury's task is a conceptually simple
one. The Mitchell jury found that the door of plaintiffs vehicle was defec-
tive.1' 4 Consequently, if it further found both that Mitchell was ejected
through that door and that his spinal cord injuries occurred outside the car,1 65
the jury should necessarily have returned a verdict against Volkswagen for the
full amount of the damages attributable to the spinal cord injuries.166
In Mitchell the special verdict answers indicated that the jury had not
158. Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 245 (2d Cir. 1981).
159. This statement assumes that there are no other, unrelated fire sources causing injury to
the plaintiff. In a given accident more than one vehicle may suffer a fire-initiating fuel loss.
160. 669 F.2d 1199 (8th Cir. 1982).
161. John Mitchell was a passenger in a Karmann Ghia that, for an unknown reason, left the
road, struck an embankment, and rolled over at least once. Mitchell was ejected. The right front
passenger door was found to be open. Id at 1201.
162. As a result of the accident, Mitchell suffered a spinal cord injury that rendered him a T2-
T3 paraplegic (spinal cord severed between second and third thoracic vertebra), with a separate
additional 75-80% upper right extremity disability caused by nerve root avulsion at all levels be-
tween C6-TI (sixth cervical and first thoracic vertebra). Mitchell contended that the door opened
because of a defect, that he was ejected through the open door, that his paraplegia and upper
extremity injury occurred outside the vehicle, and that, like the driver who was not ejected, he
would have suffered only minor injuries absent the allegedly defective door. Volkswagen con-
tended that Mitchell was ejected through a back window and that the spinal injury causing para-
plegia was sustained inside the car during the rollover prior to ejection. Id
163. Id
164. Id
165. Volkswagen admitted that the C6-Tl nerve root avulsions occurred outside the car. With
respect to that injury, the jury's only relevant concern was whether Mitchell exited through the
allegedly defective door or through the nondefective window. Id at 1201.
166. Even though the jury determined that the door was defective, it would necessarily have
returned a verdict for Volkswagen if it determined that Mitchell was ejected through the nonde-
fective window. If the jury determined that Mitchell was ejected through the defective door, but
that the T2-T3 spinal injury causing paraplegia occurred inside the car, the jury's award against




properly understood the issues it was to resolve. 167 For that reason the judg-
ment properly was reversed. The Eighth Circuit should have limited its analy-
sis to the observation that the jury's findings were totally inconsistent with the
evidence. 168 Instead, the court used the Mitchell case to launch the following
misguided attack on the majority rule enunciated in Caiazzo v. Volkswagen-
werk, A.G. :169
A rule of law which requires a plaintiff to prove what portion of indi-
visible harm was caused by each party and what might have hap-
pened in lieu of what did happen requires obvious speculation and
proof of the impossible. This approach converts the common law
rules governing principles of legal causation into a morass of confu-
sion and uncertainty.170
In Mitchell the court erroneously concluded that the plaintiff's burden of prov-
ing enhancement would lead to such an untenable result. In fact, the measure
of enhancement in such indivisible injury cases is thefull extent of the injury.
Even more disturbing in Mitchell is the court's casual, almost unknowing,
rejection of the requirement that a claimant prove the occurrence of
enhancement:
The argument is made that since the manufacturer's liability is
only for the enhanced injury, without plaintiffs proving that the in-
jury would not have occurred in the first collision, there is no proof
of an enhanced injury. The difficulty with this reasoning is that
where there is but a single indivisible injury (e.g., death, paraplegia)
it requires plaintiffs to rely on pure speculation, since in many in-
stances it is impossible to show which tortfeasor caused the indivisible
harm. Such a rule ignores common law principles on legal causation.
Our statement in Larsen should not be construed so as to subject a
* jury to a complete [sic] conjectural result.171
Such reasoning is a wholesale repudiation of Larsen and enhanced injury the-
ory. Application of that reasoning to the Mitchell case unjustly would result in
Volkswagen liability for Mitchell's spinal injury even if plaintiff was unable to
prove that the injury occurred outside the vehicle as a result of ejection
through the defective door.
167. Id at 1202-03.
168. The court correctly so held. Id. at 1209. In determining that the defective door caused
$360,000 of the plaintiffs damages, the jury returned an award that was either too high for the
upper extremity injury or too low for both the upper extremity injury and the paraplegia. Id at
1202. With its verdict, the jury necessarily determined that the door was defective, that a reason-
ably safe door would not have opened in the accident, that Mitchell was ejected through the door
and that the upper extremity injury was attributable to the defect. For that reason, on appeal, the
Eighth Circuit should have limited its analysis to the recognition that the jury either never clearly
determined how the Tl-T2 injury occurred, or was simply unaware that its "how" determination
necessarily and inescapably led to a particular all or nothing damage determination for each of
the two separate physical injuries.
169. 647 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1981).
170. Mitchell, 669 F.2d at 1205 (emphasis added). Volkswagen did not even contend that
either spinal injury was itself internally "divisible."
171. Id at 1205 (emphasis added). The Eighth Circuit panel that resolved the Mitchell case
did not include Judge Blackmun or the other two judges that formed the Larsen panel.
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(c) Fractures and soft tissue injuries
Proof of enhancement is most difficult when a claimant probably would
have been injured even without a breach of a defendant's duty, but suffered a
more severe form of the same basic injury because of it. 172 Such injuries occur
when the claimant's proposed alternative design would have lessened, rather
than eliminated, injurious contact. 173 Cases presenting such a segregation
problem commonly involve fractures or damage to muscle tissue, peripheral
nerves, or the vascular system.
Plaintiff in Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G.,17 a passenger in a
Volkswagen van, sustained injuries to her ankle and femur when the van
struck a telephone pole while traveling at approximately forty miles per
hour. 17 5 In Dreisonstok the Fourth Circuit directed that a judgment in favor
of Volkswagen be entered.' 76 Plaintiff's burden in Dreisonstok, however, was
not insurmountable. Plaintiffs proof simply failed to address the proper is-
sues. Plaintiff made no showing that her lower extremity injury was enhanced
by an alleged defect in the vehicle.
Cases involving inevitable injuries made more severe by a defendant re-
quire a more sophisticated level of proof. To prove such a claim, a plaintiff
often will need to coordinate the disciplines of engineering, kinematics and
medicine. In Dreisonstok plaintiffs engineering expert testified that the van
was unsafe because it positioned the lower extremities of front seat passengers
in a primary front-end crush zone. 177 Her treating physicians were able to
testify to the actual injuries she suffered in the accident.
Quantifying the severity of the Dreisonstok accident required a multi-fac-
eted analysis involving accident reconstruction, 178 identification and measure-
ment of the damage to the van, the occupant kinematics' 79 during the
accident, and the injuries resulting from the accident. The accident recon-
struction, vehicle damage, and kinematics issues usually are addressed by the
same engineering expert. The causal relationship between those physical cir-
172. Jeng v. Witters, 452 F. Supp. 1349, 1360 (M.D. Pa. 1978), a 'dmer., 591 F.2d 1335 (3d
Cir. 1979).
173. Lee v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 1982-1983 PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 9399, at 22,701
(Okla. 1982) (motion for rehearing pending).
174. 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974).
175. Id at 1068.
176. Id at 1074, 1076.
177. Id at 1068-69.
178. In Seese v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 648 F.2d 833, 843 n.13 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 867 (1981), the court discussed the nature of this discipline:
An accident reconstruction expert's expertise allows him to determine "the sequence of
events by application of the laws of physics and known behavioral characteristics of the
vehicle. . . in conjunction with the circumstances of the accident. The pertinent data
may include. . . impact damage, the length and nature of tire marks, the location of the
point of collision and of positions of rest of the vehicles, the speed of the vehicles, and
the maneuvers, if any, which had been performed."
Id (citation omitted).
179. As defined in DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 820 (J. Friel 25th ed.




cumstances and plaintiffs injuries is best addressed by medical experts having
specialized biomechanical' 80 knowledge.181 In Dreisonstok establishing such
a relationship was a simple matter. Plaintiff clearly suffered her injuries when
her leg was entrapped or crushed between the dashboard and the front seat.182
The Dreisonstok claim was dismissed because plaintiff failed to offer evi-
dence of a safer van design. As a result, the trier of fact had no basis for
determining that the alleged defect enhanced her injuries. The complexity of
plaintiffs burden of proof did not lead to the dismissal. The dismissal of her
claim was a direct result of a failure to identify the requisite elements of her
prima facie case. Instead of showing how the "crashability" of the van could
be improved, she offered evidence that the only reasonable frontal design was
that of an American mid-sized sedan.18 3
Dreisonstok was a case in which an enhanced injury claim, if properly
conceived and presented, might have been successful. Plaintiff could have
proposed alternative van design features that would have arguably improved
the impact characteristics of the Volkswagen van. Undoubtedly, proving that
she would have suffered lesser injuries in an alternatively designed van would
not have been a simple matter. In all likelihood, plaintiff would have suffered
some injury to the same leg even if she had been riding in a redesigned vehi-
cle. To establish enhancement, plaintiff necessarily would have had to pres-
ent expert testimony regarding the extent of the inward intrusion and other
damage that the redesigned vehicle would have experienced in the same acci-
dent. Plaintiffs expert then could have correlated that hypothetical damage
estimate with the occupant kinematics that would be involved in the same
hypothetical accident. In Dreisonstok even if plaintiff had established gener-
ally both the part of the redesigned vehicle that would have contacted the
occupant and the force and manner of the occupant contact, she would still
have had to prove what physical injuries she would have suffered as a result of
such a hypothetical contact.184
180. "Biomechanics" is "the application of mechanical laws to living structures, specifically to
the locomotor system of the human body." Id at 201.
181. In most jurisdictions, trial courts evaluate the qualifications of expert witnesses on a case-
by-case basis. Some courts have allowed engineers and "accident reconstructionists" to testify
about this relationship. See Seese v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 648 F.2d 833, 343-44 (3d Cir.) (ex-
pert based opinions on testimony given by physicians in independently admissible depositions),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 867 (1981); Gray v. General Motors Corp., 434 F.2d 110, 112 (8th Cir. 1970)
(ruling partly based upon adverse party's inviting such comments during cross-examination and
upon the failure to challenge the witness' qualifications). Cf. Yetter v. Rajeskd, 364 F. Supp. 105,
109 (E.D.N.J. 1973) (medical testimony necessary to prove what injuries would have been suffered
in alternatively designed van).
182. Driesonstok, 489 F.2d at 1068.
183. Id at 1074-75.
184. If provided with such information, the jury would have a basis for qualitatively determin-
ing that enhancement had taken place. In cases in which a jury so determines, it would be able to
roughly calculate, in monetary terms, the difference between the injuries actually suffered and
those that would have been suffered absent the defendant's breach of duty. Such calculations will
necessarily be general in nature. In rendering its award, however, the jury should consider all the
different aspects of both the actual and hypothetical injuries. In an accident similar to that in
Dreisonstok, a van passenger might require an above the knee leg amputation as the combined
result of a severely comminuted tibial fracture, derangement of the knee joint, nerve damage and
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(d) Death
Death is qualitatively different than even the severest of injuries. On
first impression, there seems to be no way to measure the extent of enhance-
ment in death cases. Actually, the damage elements of a wrongful death re-
covery can be quantitatively compared with the damage elements in personal
injury actions.
The metaphysical distinctions between life and death are beyond mean-
ingful quantification. Even in an ordinary wrongful death case, however, the
spiritual aspects of death are not elements of recovery. In most states, wrong-
ful death statutes allow the recovery of the following three damage elements:
1. Funeral expenses and medical expenses incurred prior to death as a
result of the accident;
2. An award consisting of the net assets that the decedent would have
left in his estate had he lived to his normal life expectancy, or the survivors'
claims for the specific contributions that survivors would have received from
the decedent had he not died;
3. Damages to the survivors for the loss of love, companionship, care,
advice and society of the decedent.1 85
By definition, all three elements are capable of being translated into monetary
damage awards.
Enhanced injury accidents resulting in death, like those that cause non-
fatal injuries, can be classifed into two broad ctegories. The first type of death
case is that in which the only significant injuries are the fatal injuries caused
by the defect. Proving the extent of enhancement in such cases is a simple
matter. All of the decedent's damages will be attributable to the defendant's
alleged wrongdoing. In Fox v. Ford Motor Co. 186 the Tenth Circuit consid-
ered such a straightforward case. The Fox court correctly recognized that the
defendant's liability is for the full measure of decedent's wrongful death dam-
a ruptured femoral artery. The passenger's actual general and special damages related to the
amputation would have several different aspects. His general damages would be based on, among
other things, the nature and extent or his injury, disfigurement resulting from the amputation, and
pain and suffering. Special damage items in such a case could include amounts for loss of wages,
impairment of future earning capacity, medical and hospital bills, and costs related to vocational
retraining.
The plaintiff's experts might conclude that, in a safe van, the passenger's injuries would have
been limited to a severe, but less extensively comminuted, tibial fracture that would cause residual
problems but which would not require amputation. The total damages attributable to the leg
amputation suffered by the passenger would vary from the lesser hypothetical damages in several
different aspects of general and special damages. By determining the overall difference, the trier
makes the ultimate determination regarding the extent of enhancement. Fixing a dollar amount
that roughly reflects the difference is a matter left to the trier's best judgment. Certainly, the
parties can simplify the trier's task by using expert damage testimony and other evidentiary tools
that highlight, aspect by aspect, the different ramifications of the actual and the hypothetical
injuries.
185. The exact language used to describe this element of wrongful death recovery varies from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For a formulation similar to that in the accompanying text, see Fox v.
Ford Motor Co., 575 F.2d 774, 788 (10th Cir. 1978) (discussing Wyoming statute).
186. 575 F.2d 774 (10th Cir. 1978).
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ages when the fatal injuries caused by the defect were the decedent's only sig-
nificant injuries.
The analysis in Fox, however, is faulty. The court broadly determined
that all enhanced injury death awards were "indivisible."' 187 In making such
an all-encompassing statement, the court failed even to recognize that a second
type of enhanced injury death case existed. Contrary to the reasoning in Fox,
there are enhanced damage death cases in which the trier of fact will be re-
quired to measure the extent of enhancement. In such death cases, in addition
to the fatal injuries caused by the defect, the decedent also may suffer serious
injuries wholly unrelated to any alleged defect.
If a defective steering column causes a fatal aortic rupture, and the dece-
dent suffered no other injuries, the trier of fact evaluates the three elements of
wrongful death recovery as it would in any tort case. It would be unfair for
the trier of fact to use the same analysis when, unrelated to any defect, the
decedent also suffered a severed spine at the fourth cervical (C4) vertebra in
the same accident. The trier of fact must consider the ramifications of such
unrelated injuries in computing the three elements of its award.1 88
Even if the decedent would have been a C4-level quadriplegic had he
lived, his estate or survivors are entitled to recover funeral expenses because
those costs would not have been incurred except for his death. Any award for
pre-death medical costs should be limited to those related to the fatal injuries.
Any treatment costs for the spinal injury are not compensable.
The major component of the second wrongful death damage element is
the decedent's future net earnings. When a decedent would have been a C4-
level quadriplegic had he survived, the trier of fact must decide to what extent,
if any, the damages were enhanced by the defect. Even though defect-related
fatal injuries absolutely terminate a decedent's earning capacity, C4-level
quadriplegia often produces the same result. In such a case, the second ele-
187. Id at 787.
188. Such an analysis can be as readily performed in death cases as in personal injury litiga-
tion. In discussing analogous cases involving the negligent deprivation of a person's survival
chances, one commentator recognized that the recovery by the decedent's estate must be based
upon what the decedent's condition would have been had the negligent act not occurred:
To illustrate, consider a patient who suffers a heart attack and dies as a result. As-
sume that the defendant-physician negligently misdiagnosed the patient's condition, but
that the patient would have had only a 40% chance of survival even with a timely diag-
nosis and proper care. Regardless of whether it could be said that the defendant caused
the decedent's death, he caused the loss of a chance, and that chance-interest should be
completely redressed in its own right. Under the proposed rule, the plaintiffs compensa-
tion for the loss of the victim's chance of surviving the heart attack would be 40% of the
compensable value of the victim's life hadhe survived (including what his earning capac-
ity would otherwise have been in the years following death). The value placed on the
patient's life would reflect such factors as his age, health, and earning potential, includ-
ing the fact that he had suffered the heart attack and the assumption that he had survived
it. The 40% computation would be applied to that base figure.
King, Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Preexisting Condition
andFuture Consequences, 90 YALE LJ. 1353, 1382 (1981) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
In Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 738 (3d Cir. 1976), the court noted that, in enhanced
injury cases involving death, the decedent's estate must do more than show that absent a defect the
accident was "survivable.'
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ment must be calculated in the strict context of what the decedent probably
would have accumulated in the future if he had suffered C4-level
quadriplegia, but not death.
The third wrongful death element is an intangible one. Nevertheless, any
award for the loss of the decedent's love, companionship, and care must be
computed in the context of the unrelated serious injuries that the decedent
inevitably would have suffered. Especially with respect to providing physical
care for others, a C4-level quadriplegic's capabilities are more limited than
those of a non-injured person. Consequently, any award for the third element
should only be for the love and other intangible support that the survivors




The states have not followed a uniform course in determining whether,
and how, the doctrines of comparative negligence, assumption of the risk, mis-
use, and mitigation of damages will be applied in products liability actions.
Some courts have held that a comparative negligence defense cannot be as-
serted to reduce a strict liability in tort award.' 89 Many of those same courts
will allow a defendant to assert the absolute defenses of assumption of the
risk' 90 or misuse' 91 in such cases. The modem trend is to consolidate prod-
189. See, e.g., McCarty v. F.C. Kingston Co., 22 Ariz. App. 17, 18, 522 P.2d 778, 779 (1974);
Gangi v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 33 Conn. Supp. 81, 84-85, 360 A.2d 907, 908 (1976); Collins v.
Musgrave, 28 Ill. App. 3d 307, 311-12, 328 N.E.2d 649, 652 (1974); Clauseir v. Ed Fanning Chev-
rolet, Inc., 8 Ill. App. 3d 1053, 1058, 291 N.E.2d 202, 206 (1972); Henderson v. Ford Motor Co.,
519 S.W.2d 87, 89-90 (rex. 1974). The Restatement takes the postition that only that form of
contributory negligence constituting assumption of risk can be asserted as a defense. See infra
note 190 (text of § 402A comment n).
190. The most commonly invoked formulation of that defense in strict liability in tort cases is
that set out in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment n (1965), which is as follows:
Since the liability with which this Section deals is not based upon negligence of the
seller, but is strict liability, the rule applied to strict liability cases (see § 524) applies.
Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when such negligence consists
merely in a failure to discover the defect in the product, or to guard against the possibil-
ity of its existence. On the other hand the form of contributory negligence which consists
in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger, and com-
monly passes under the name of assumption of risk, is a defense under this Section as in
other cases of strict liability. If the user or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of
the danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product and is
injured by it, he is barred from recovery.
The assumption of risk defense is recognized in virtually all jurisdictions that have adopted
§ 402A and not expressly modified its provisions by adopting a unitary comparative defense.
191. The most commonly invoked statement of this defense is that set out in RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment g (1965), which is as follows:
The rule stated in this Section applies only where the product is, at the time it leaves
the seller's hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will
be unreasonably dangerous to him. The seller is not liable when he delivers the product
in a safe condition, and subsequent mishandling or other causes make it harmful by the
time it is consumed. The burden of proof that the product was in a defective condition at
the time that it left the hands of the particular seller is upon the injured plaintiff; and
[Vol. 62
ENHANCED INJURY
ucts liability defenses and allow the unitary defense of comparative fault' 92 to
be asserted as an award-reducing, rather than absolute, defense. 193
In enhanced injury cases, unlike ordinary products liability cases, a claim-
ant's fault194 in causing the accident is not a basis for reducing his recovery.' 95
unless evidence can be produced which will support the conclusion that it was then de-
fective, the burden is not sustained.
Safe condition at the time of delivery by the seller will, however, include proper
packaging, necessary sterilization, and other precautions required to permit the product
to remain safe for a normal length of time when handled in a normal manner.
According to the Restatement, proof that there has been no change in condition is an element of
the plaintifi's prima fade case.
192. UN IF. PROD. LIABILITY AcT, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,734 (1979)). Courts have also used the
terms "equitable apportionment of loss" and "comparative negligence" to describe this unitary
defense. Because the term "comparative fault" has already gained such "wide acceptance by
courts and in the literature, all courts should adopt its use." Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20
Cal. 3d 725, 742, 575 P.2d 1162 1172, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 390 (1978).
193. This approach was adopted in the UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1, 12 U.L.A. 36
(1977). Section 1 of that Act sets up the following unitary comparative fault system:
(a) In an action based on fault seeking to recover damages for injury or death to
person or harm to property, any contributory fault chargeable to the claimant diminishes
proportionately the amount awarded as compensatory damages for an injury attributa-
ble to the claimant's contributory fault, but does not bar recovery. This rule applies
whether or not under prior law the claimant's contributory fault constituted a defense or
was disregarded under applicable legal doctrines, such as last clear chance.
(b) "Fault" includes acts or ommissions that are in any measure negligent or reck-
less toward the person or property of the actor or others, or that subject a person to strict
tort liability. The term also includes breach of warranty, unreasonable assumption of
risk not constituting an enforceable express consent, misuse of a product for which the
defendant otherwise would be liable, and unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to
mitigate damages. Legal requirements of causal relation apply both to fault as the basis
for liability and to contributory fault.
While the Act itself has no legislative effect, the Supreme Court of California indicated that the
Act "points in the direction of a responsible national trend." Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20
Cal. 3d 725, 741-42, 575 P.2d 1162, 1172, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 390 (1978). In Daly the court listed
various jurisdictions and commentators that favor such a unitary comparative approach. Id at
739-42, 575 P.2d at 1170-71, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 388-89.
194. It makes no difference whether the fault is what formerly had been characterized as negli-
gence or as misuse.
195. In Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968), the court recog-
nized that the reasons for the accident had no bearing on an enhanced injury claim:
The manufacturer should not be heard to say that it does not intend its product to be
involved in any accident when it can easily foresee and when it knows that the
probability over the life of its product is high, that it will be involved in some type of
injury-producing accident.... Collisions with or without fault of the user are clearly
foreseeable by the manufacturer and are statistically inevitable.
See also Engberg v. Ford Motor Co., 205 N.W.2d 104, 108 (N.D. 1973).
Several courts have implicitly recognized that negligence in causing an accident to occur is
not a basis for reducing an enhanced injury award. Higginbotham v. Ford Motor Co., 540 F.2d
762, 767 n.6 (5th Cir. 1976); Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 735 (3d Cir. 1976); Passwaters v.
General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270, 1275-76 (8th Cir. 1972); Grundmanis v. British Motor
Corp., 308 F. Supp. 303, 306 (E.D. Wis. 1970); Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064,
1972-73 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Roberts v. May, 41 Colo. App. 82, 86-87, 583 P.2d 305, 307 (1978);
Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 516, 513 P.2d 268, 274 (1973);
Mickle v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 230, 166 S.E.2d 173, 185 (1969); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v.
Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975). See also Knippen v. Ford Motor Co., 546 F.2d 993,
1002 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (issue raised, but held moot).
In Frericks v. General Motors Corp., 274 Md. 2d 288, 304-05, 336 A.2d 118, 127-28 (1975), the
court's policy discussion parallels that in Larsen. In Frericks, however, the court's ruling was not
consistent with its own policy statement. While recognizing that the "initial cause of the accident"
did not "abrogate the manufacturer's duty" to design a safe vehicle, it held that at least in a
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Undoubtedly, many accidents are the result of the injured party's negli-
gence. 196 Nevertheless, a manufacturer's duty is that of minimizing the injuri-
ous effects of contact however caused. The inevitability of both operator
negligence and injury-producing contact was a primary reason for the judicial
recognition of the duty to protect against enhanced injuries. 197 The cause of
the contact has no bearing on the issue of whether an object's response to the
contact was a reasonable one.198 The trier of fact's analysis must be limited to
the nature and severity of the contact and the object's response. A negligent
operator is entitled to the same protection against unnecessary injury as the
careful user of the same product is entitled.
A claimant's recovery should be reduced for any comparative fault, in-
cluding a failure to mitigate damages, causally related to the enhancement of
his injuries. 199 In enhanced injury litigation, such comparative fault will ordi-
narily involve one of two general types of conduct. The first is failing to have
a manufacturing or durability problem repaired.20° The second type of con-
negligence-based case, an enhanced injury award would be barred by a driver's negligence in
causing the accident. Id
Other courts also have concluded erroneously that such negligence should reduce a plaintiff's
recovery in an enhanced injury case. See Fietzer v. Ford Motor Co., 590 F.2d 215, 218-19 (7th
Cir. 1978) (negligence in causing accident will reduce enhanced injury award); Trust Corp. of
Mont. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 506 F. Supp. 1093, 1098 (D. Mont. 1981) (ruled erroneously after
properly defining issue); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 731-32, 575 P.2d 1162,
1165, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 383 (1978) (failed to distinguish between enhanced injury cases and
ordinary products liability cases); Albertson v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 230 Kan. 368, 369-73, 634
P.2d 1127, 1129-32 (1981) (ruling based upon general decision to reduce strict liability in tort
claims by percentage of comparative negligence); Cousins v. Instrument Flyer, Inc,, 58 A.D.2d
336, 339, 396 N.Y.S.2d 655, 657 (1977) (after expressly considering plaintiff's argument that acci-
dent-causing and injury-causing factors were distinct); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 632 S.W.2d
375, 388-89 (rex. Civ. App. 1982) (negligence in piloting an aircraft was viable defense in en-
hanced injury case); Arbet v. Gussarson, 66 Wis. 2d 551, 557-58, 225 N:W.2d 431, 436 (1975)
(confusing issue of whether vehicle performed reasonably in given accident with "issue" of con-
tributory negligence).
Both the Uniform Comparative Fault Act and the Uniform Product Liability Act fail to ad-
dress this issue.
196. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968).
197. Id
198. For that reason, evidence regarding the inebriation of a plaintiff-driver, or other drivers
or passengers, should be excluded unless that evidence is relevant to some other issue. Badorek v.
General Motors Corp., 11 Cal. App. 3d 902, 932, 90 Cal. Rptr. 305, 325 (1970). Evidence regard-
ing why the accident occurred is irrelevant. See supra note 195. If a participant testified regarding
the speeds, physical forces, or other circumstances relating to how the product performed, limita-
tions regarding his ability to perceive how the accident happened can properly be explored. See
Fietzer v. Ford Motor Co., 590 F.2d 215, 217 (7th Cir. 1978) (involving, although not discussing,
such a situation in an enhanced injury case). See also FED. R. EV1D. 401; infra text accompanying
notes 236-39.
199. This is the approach taken in the UNiF. CompARATivp FAULT ACT § 1, 12 U.L.A. 36
(1977).
200. There are no reported cases specifically addressing the award-reducing effect of this type
of conduct. Contributory fault should operate as an award-reducing factor in ordinary products
liability cases. See supra note 193 and accompanying text. In enhanced injury cases, when the
contributory fault is an "injury-enhancing," rather than an "accident-causing" factor, such negli-
gence should also operate as an award-reducing factor.
It seems clear that a failure to repair constitutes "comparative fault" as that term is defined in
the Uniform Comparative Fault Act. In Wade, Product Liability and Plaintif's Fault-The Uni-
form Comparative Fault Act, 29 MERCER L. Rav. 373, 388 (1978), Professor John W. Wade,
Chairman of the special committee drafting the Act, noted the following:
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duct is the failure to use a product's own safety features or devices.20 1
Some courts erroneously have determined that a consumer may assume
the risk of obvious defects in a product's design.20 2 Allowing a defendant to
assert such a defense, either as a comparative factor or as an absolute bar, is
both unfair and conceptually unsound. A product manufacturer has the sole
responsibility of safely designing a product. Consumers have no correspond-
ing duty, or ability, to analyze even obvious design features. Manufacturers
cannot fairly state that a consumer acted wrongfully in purchasing and using
the products that the manufacturer has represented to be reasonably safe.20 3
The Act would apply the comparative fault principle to the case in which the manufac-
turer is strictly liable and the plaintiff was contributorily negligent, regardless of whether
the plaintiff's negligence was concerned with maintaining the safety aspects of the prod-
uct or with some other tort rule imposing liability in order to promote safety.
A failure to repair would also be the basis for the award-reducing "comparative responsibil-
ity" defense proposed in UNIF. PROD. LiAB. ACT, §§ 111, 112(A)(2), and 112(B)(1), 44 Fed. Reg.
62,734-37 (1979). In states adhering to the approach taken in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A comment n (1965), such a failure would operate as a defense only if it constituted a volun-
tary and unreasonable encountering of a known risk. A defendant would have difficulty in prov-
ing subjective knowledge about a specific danger. See Good v. A.B. Chance Co., 39 Colo. App.
70, 565 P.2d 217 (1977); Heil Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976). The Restate-
ment defense, if established, is an absolute bar to recovery.
201. See infra notes 206-33 and accompanying text. UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1, 12
U.L.A. 36 (1977), expressly provides that an unreasonable failure to avoid injury or to mitigate
damages constitutes comparative fault. The text of § 1 is set out supra note 193.
202. See Wooten v. White Trucks, 514 F.2d 634, 637-40 (5th Cir. 1975); Horn v. General
Motors Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 359, 369-70, 551 P.2d 398, 403, 131 Cal. Rptr. 78, 83 (1976); Buccery v.
General Motors Corp., 60 Cal. App. 3d 533, 550, 132 Cal. Rptr. 605, 616 (1976); Ellithorpe v. Ford
Motor Co., 503 S.W.2d 516, 522 (Tenn. 1973); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145,
148-49, 542 P.2d 774, 779 (1975). Other courts have reached the same untenable result by holding
that a manufacturer cannot be held liable for a defective design if the defect was "patent" or
"obvious" to the user. Bremier v. Volkswagen, 340 F. Supp. 949, 951 (].D.C. 1972); Bolm v.
Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 151, 156-57, 305 N.E.2d 769, 772, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644, 648-49 (1973).
Section 112(A)(2) of the Uniform Product Liability Act is so broadly drafted that it can be con-
strued to allow the assertion of such a conceptually unsound defense:
(2) Claimant's failure to observe an apparent defective condition. When the product
seller proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the claimant, while using the prod-
uct, was injured by a defective condition that would have been apparent, without inspec-
tion, to an ordinarily reasonably prudent person, the claimant's damages shall be subject
to reduction ....
44 Fed. Reg. 62,736 (1979).
In fact, the "obviousness" of a design feature and a purchaser's "assumptions" and expecta-
tions are factors bearing upon the breach of duty issue. As one of the erring courts itself recog-
nized, the central consideration in determining whether a vehicle is "not reasonably safe" is
whether it is unsafe to an "extent beyond that which would be reasonably contemplated by the
ordinary consumer." Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 148, 542 P.2d 774, 779
(1975). A defendant should not be allowed to set up that same "obviousness" argument a second
time, albeit in a subjective format as an affirmative defense.
203. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment c (1965), directly addressed
this issue:
c. On whatever theory, the justification for the strict liability has been said to be
that the seller, by marketing his product for use and consumption, has undertaken and
assumed a special responsibility toward any member of the consuming public who may
be injured by it; that the public has the right to and does expect, in the case of products
which it needs and for which it is forced to rely upon the seller, that reputable sellers will
stand behind their goods; that public policy demands that the burden of accidental inju-
ries caused by products intended for consumption be placed upon those who market
them ....
Comment n to § 402A recognizes that a consumer cannot be held responsible for "failing to dis-
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Some products, however, are defective because they fail to conform to a
manufacturer's own design criteria. No manufacturer can eliminate totally
manufacturing, durability, and quality control problems. Indeed, a defect re-
ducing a product's crash protection might not become obvious, or even de-
velop, until the product has been used for a substantial period of time. While a
manufacturer is liable for such a defect, the trier of fact fairly may determine
that the claimant's conduct was also a cause of his suffering the more severe
injury. Consumers should not be legally obligated to inspect products for
manufacturing defects. 2°4 A comparative fault defense should be allowed
when a product user is injured by a manufacturing defect of which he was
aware or that would have been obvious to an ordinary reasonably prudent
person.20 5
When a defendant has proved negligent use of a defective product, the
trier of fact must determine the relative culpability of the parties for allowing
the defect to exist. This same qualitative judgment is performed in ordinary
negligence cases. A claimant's recovery is reduced in direct proportion to his
percentage of causal responsibility. In fixing the claimant's percentage, the
trier has no conceptual framework with which to measure the extent of en-
cover" a defect. As comment c impliedly recognizes, it would be equally unjust to charge a con-
sumner with an obligation to observe, and act upon, the "apparent" conditions that make up the
inherent, planned design of a product.
204. Section 112(A)(1) of the Uniform Product Liability Act provides the following rule:
A claimant is not required to have inspected the product for a defective condition.
Failure to have done so does not render the claimant responsible for the harm caused or
reduce the claimant's damages.
44 Fed. Reg. 62,736 (1979). See also supra notes 202-03.
205. Section 112(A)(2) of the Uniform Product Liability Act so provides. See supra note 202
for the text of that section. Therefore, a user with actual knowledge of a defect should have his
reovery reduced. See UNIF. PROD. LIABILITY AcT § 112(B)(1), 44 Fed. Reg. 62,736-37 (1979).
In its analysis, the Department of Commerce discussed the legitimate reasons for reducing an
award even when a user does not have actual knowledge of an apparent defect:
(2) Claimant's Failure to Observe an Apparent Defective Condition. Cases can arise
where a defect would be apparent, without inspection, to an ordinary reasonably prudent
person. Subsection (A)(2) incorporates the Task Forces's views in this area, permitting
the trier of fact to consider this conduct and reduce claimant's damages. Under Com-
ment n to the "Restatement (Second) of Torts" Section 402A, an individual who failed to
discover an apparent defective condition would, theoretically, still be allowed a full
claim. On the other hand, if that person knew about the defect and proceeded anyway,
the claim would be totally barred. This approach has led to considerable litigation and
expense over the issue of whether a claimant knew or did not know about a particular
defect. See "Task Force Report" at VII-51-53; see also "Karabatsos v. Spivey Co.," 49
Ill. App. 3d 317, 364 N.E.2d 319 (1977); "Teagle v. Fischer & Porter Co.," 89 Wash. 2d
149, 570 P.2d 438 (1977); "Poches v. J.J. Newberry Co.," 549 F.2d 1166 (8th Cir. 1977).
The Act eliminates this distinction and focuses on the true responsibility of the product
user.
Thus, ifa claimant with good eyesight ate a candy bar that had bright green worms
crawling over it, Subsection (A)(2) permits the trier of fact to find that the claimant
should bear some responsibility for any ill effects suffered. This example involves a de-
fective condition that can be discovered without inspection. Cf "Auburn Mach. Works
Co. v. Jones," 366 So.2d 1167 (Fla. 1979).
Subsection (A)(2) will not promote misconduct by products sellers, If they were
aware of the defect in the goods at the time of sale, the punitive damages section of the
Act (Section 120) would provide a strong incentive not to sell such a product.
44 Fed. Reg. 62,737 (1979).
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hancement attributable to the plaintiffs comparative negligence. In such a
case, both the defendant's breach of duty and the claimant's fault combine to
produce the same, undifferentiated injury. The defendant is liable to the
claimant for any enhancement of injuries over and above those that would
have occurred absent the defect. Because the claimant is also responsible for
the defect's existence, his net award should be computed by reducing the total
amount of enhanced damages in proportion to his comparative fault.
B. The Seat Belt Issue
The second general type of award-reducing conduct, the failure to use
safety devices, most often has been addressed in the context of automotive seat
belts and harnesses.2°6 Some state legislatures have enacted statutes prohibit-
ing the assertion of any defense based on the failure to wear belts.207 In other
states, courts have judicially imposed the same prohibition.20 Unfortunately,
in states prohibiting such a defense, there has been no recognition of the differ-
ence between ordinary negligence cases and enhanced injury litigation.20 9 De-
206. The issue also has been addressed in airplane cases. See, eg., Trust Corp. of Mont. v.
Piper Aircraft Corp., 506 F. Supp. 1093, 1096 (D. Mont. 1981); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282
Or. 61, 69, 577 P.2d 1322, 1327 (1978).
207. In Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 231, 160 S.E.2d 65, 68 (1968), the court noted that, as of
that time, Minnesota, Virginia, and Tennessee had enacted legislation specifying that the failure to
use seat belts should not be deemed contributory negligence. In Wilson v. Volkswagen of Am.,
Inc., 445 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Va. 1978), the court distinguished the Virginia statute from the other
two states' statutes. It held that the Virginia statute did not prohibit the introduction of evidence
of nonuse of a seat belt in enhanced injury cases. According to Wilson, such evidence could be
considered in mitigation of damages. Id at 1373-74. See also Ellithorpe v. Ford Motor Co., 503
S.W.2d 516, 520 (Tenn. 1973) (discussing TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-930, now codified at § 55-9-214
(1981)); MnIN. STAT. ANN. § 169-685(4) (1981); VA. CODE § 46.1-309.1(b) (1974). In Sours v.
General Motors Corp., 717 F.2d 1511, 1520 n.5 (6th Cir. 1983), the court discussed the different
positions taken by the states on the seat belt issue.
208. In Amend v. Bell, 89 Wash. 2d 124, 133-34, 570 P.2d 138, 143-44 (1977), the court listed
the courts that had previously rejected the seat belt defense. The court noted that the majority of
the courts considering the issue had rejected the defense. Id
209. In those states in which the seat belt defense has been rejected, evidence of a manufac-
turer's installation of the belt should be allowed. The incorporation of a belt in the vehicle bears
upon the design issue and the trier's determination regarding whether the manufacturer breached
its duty to design a safe vehicle. The manufacturer has a right to address this aspect of the plain-
tiff's prima facie case even if the affirmative defense of nonuse is not allowed. As the court recog-
nized in Wilson v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 445 F. Supp. 1368, 1370-71 (E.D. Va. 1978), the trier's
function is that of determining whether the vehicle "as a whole" was unsafe. In Wilson the trier
needed to evaluate not only the allegedly defective roof but also seat belts and the vehicle's other
intrinsic safety devices that tended to prevent injuries such as those suffered by the plaintiff. See
also Sours v. General Motors Corp., 717 F.2d 1511, 1522 (6th Cir. 1983). In Daly v. General
Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 746, 575 P.2d 1162, 1174-75, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 392-93 (1978), the
court discussed the reasons for allowing evidence on the incorporation of belts: "
[The plaintiffs] urge that only the precise malfunctioning component itself, and alone,
may be considered in determining whether injury was caused by a defectively designed
product. We disagree, concluding that the issue of defective design is to be determined
with respect to the product as a whole, and that the trial court's instruction was correct.
The jury could properly determine whether the Opel's overall design, including
safety features provided in the vehicle, made it "crashworthy," thus rendering the vehicle
nondefective. Product designs do not evolve in a vacuum, but must reflect the realities of
the market place, kitchen, highway, and shop. Similarly, a product's components are not
developed in isolation but as part of an integrated and interrelated whole. Recognizing
that finished products must incorporate and balance safety, utility, competitive merit,
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fendants should be allowed to assert the seat belt defense in enhanced injury
cases.210 As the draftsmen of the 1977 Uniform Comparative Fault Act have
generally recognized, a claimant's award should be proportionately dimin-
ished for any "unreasonable failure to avoid injury or to mitigate dam-
ages. '2 11 Courts that have properly analyzed the issue in enhanced injury
litigation have independently reached the same result.212
In Amend v. Bell, 2 13 a negligence case, the Supreme Court of Washington
discussed the four grounds most commonly advanced for rejection of the seat
belt defense. In rejecting the defense as a matter of law, the court made the
following policy determinations:
1. Because the plaintiff has no duty to anticipate the defendant driver's
negligence in causing the accident, the plaintifi's failure to protect himself
from the consequences of such negligence should not diminish his recovery;214
2. Because seat belts are not required, or present, in all vehicles, the
and practicality under a multitude of intended and foreseeable uses, courts have strug-
gled to evolve realistic tests for defective design which give weight to this necessary bal-
ancing. Thus, a number of California cases have recognized the need to "weigh"
competing considerations in an overall product design, in order to determine whether the
design was "defective."
The danger of piecemeal consideration of isolated components has been expressly
recognized. Specifically, it has been observed that a design rendered safe in one situation
may become more dangerous in others. However phrased, these decisions emphasize the
need to consider the product as an integrated whole.
Id (citations omitted). In Seese v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 648 F.2d 833, 842-43 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 867 (1981), the court held that evidence of incorporation of belts was inadmissi-
ble unless the belts were conceived by the company's engineers as an integral part of the allegedly
defective system that failed. The court held that such evidence was properly rejected because the
company's engineers did not design the van's window retention system with the assumption that
belts would be used. Id In rendering such a ruling the court failed to note that the relevant
concern was how the vehicle as a whole performed. A company's conduct, favorable or unfavora-
ble, is irrelevant. As an overwhelming majority of courts have recognized, the proper focus in
such cases is on the product and not the manufacturer's conduct. See Sherk v. Daisy-Heddon, 498
Pa. 594, 613, 450 A.2d 615, 631 (1982). A company's engineering analysis has no bearing on the
trier's assessment of a vehicle's performance. A manufacturer, moreover, should not be penalized
because a component is designed with the intent that it will survive an impact and not require the
protective capabilities of a failsafe device.
Even in those states in which the seat belt defense has been rejected, in some cases evidence
of nonuse of the belt must be admitted. When there is a legitimate dispute regarding the mecha-
nism of a plaintiff's injury, the defendant must be allowed to forthrightly discuss the plaintiff's
position and movements within the vehicle after impact. See Sours v. General Motors Corp., 717
F.2d 1511, 1521-22 (6th Cir. 1983) (in arguing that unrestrained "dive" into roof rail, and not
collapse of roof, caused plaintiff's broken neck, manufacturer made it "patently obvious" that
plaintiff was not wearing seatbelt).
210. See infra notes 211-212, 230-33 and accompanying text.
211. UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT AcT § 1, 12 U.L.A. 36 (1977).
212. Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 647 F.2d 251-52 (2d Cir. 1981); Melia v. Ford Motor
Co. 534 F.2d 795, 799 n.6 (8th Cir. 1976) (whether seat belt issue was properly submitted was moot
on appeal); Wilson v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 445 F. Supp. 1368, 1373-74 (E.D. Va. 1978); Spier
v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 450-51, 323 N.E.2d 164, 167-68, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916, 921 (1974). See also
Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725,744-45, 575 P.2d 1162, 1173-74, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380,
391-92 (1978) (prospectively allowing such defense, and in so doing, overruling Horn v. General
Motors Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 359, 369-71, 551 P.2d 398, 403-04, 131 Cal. Rptr. 78, 83-84 (1976), on this
point); Roberts v. May, 41 Colo. App. 82, 583 P.2d 305 (1978) (reaching correct result by mis-
characterizing nonuse as "misuse" or "assumption of the risk").
213. 89 Wash. 2d 124, 570 P.2d 138 (1977).
214. Id at 133, 570 P.2d at 143.
[Vol. 62
ENHANCED INJURY
defendant driver should not be entitled to take advantage of the fortuitous
circumstance that the plaintiffs car was so equipped; 215
3. The majority of motorists do not habitually use seat belts;216
4. Because the seat belt defense would lead to a "veritable battle of ex-
perts" regarding what injuries would have been avoided had the belt been
used, the defense would require "substantial speculation" by the trier of
fact.2 17
Whatever vitality such reasoning has in ordinary negligence cases is
wholly absent in enhanced injury litigation. The first reason is philosophically
inconsistent with enhanced injury theory. A manufacturer's duty is based
upon the need to minimize the injurious effects of statistically inevitable acci-
dents. When asserting an enhancement claim against a manufacturer, a claim-
ant should be charged with the same generalized knowledge and
responsibility.218 Allowing the assertion of the defense in an ordinary negli-
gence case would require a comparison of qualitatively different causal ele-
ments. A negligent driver will often be 100 percent responsible for causing an
accident. If wearing a seat belt would have prevented all injuries resulting
from the accident, it could be argued that, in failing to wear a belt, the plaintiff
was 100 percent responsible for injuries being suffered. In enhanced injury
cases, the assertion of the seat belt defense does not require the trier of fact to
perform such a conceptually flawed analysis. Assertion of the defense in en-
hanced injury cases, moreover, does not create the same visceral sense2 19 of
unfairness as that generated when a defendant asserts the defense in an ordi-
nary negligence case. Like the injured claimant, the manufacturer of the vehi-
cle did not cause the accident to occur.
The second reason for rejecting the defense is equally inapposite in an
enhanced injury case. In evaluating a design claim against a manufacturer,
the presence of a seat belt in the accident vehicle is anything but fortuitous.




218. In Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968), the court recognized
that consumers, as well as manufacturers, should be charged with such knowledge:
The intended use and purpose of an automobile is to travel on the streets and highways,
which travel more often than not is in close proximity to other vehicles and at speeds that
carry the possibility, probability, and potential of injury-producing impacts. The reali-
ties of the intended and actual use are well known to the manufacturer and to thepublic
and these realities should be squarely faced by the manufacturer and the courts.
Id at 502-03 (emphasis added). See also Grundmanis v. British Motor Corp., 308 F. Supp. 303,
306 (E.D. Wis. 1970); Baumgardner v. American Motors, 83 Wash. 2d 751, 757-58, 522 P.2d 829,
832 (1974).
219. In Amend v. Bell, 89 Wash. 2d 124, 570 P.2d 138 (1977), the court did not directly ad-
dress this issue. This concern, however, is implicit in the court's statement that a defendant should
not be entitled "to take advantage" of the plaintiff's vehicle having seat belts. Id at 133, 570 P.2d
at 143. See also Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 237, 160 S.E.2d 65, 73 (1968) ("harsh and un-
sound" to deny recovery and "exonerate active tortfeasor" in ordinary negligence case when fail-
ure to buckle belt did not contribute to the accident); Sours v. General Motors Corp., 717 F.2d
1511, 1519-20 (6th Cir. 1983) (Ohio's rejection of the defense in negligence cases based upon
"antipathy" to defendant who "caused" an accident asserting such a defense).
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fects of an accident. The third reason is not a legitimate basis for the whole-
sale rejection of the seat belt defense. That many occupants negligently fail to
use readily available seat belts does not mean that any particular occupant is
justified in so acting.220 A manufacturer whose vehicle has a defective door
latch cannot escape liability because many other manufacturers' vehicles con-
tain the same defect.
The fourth reason for rejecting the defense is fallacious in the context of
both enhanced injury litigation and ordinary negligence cases. Modem litiga-
tion often requires the trier of fact to evaluate confficting expert testimony.
Even in an ordinary negligence case, the trier often will necessarily analyze the
conflicting testimony of two accident reconstructionists. Courts do not disal-
low enhanced injury claims because the presentation of the prima facie case,
and the defendant's response to it, creates a "veritable battle of experts. '221 In
fact, plaintiffs have been allowed to prove that their injuries were enhanced
because a vehicle's seat belt failed and did not perform its protective func-
tion.222 Evaluating the seat belt defense is no more speculative than an analy-
sis of such a seat belt failure claim. Both issues require the trier of fact to
220. See supra note 218.
221. As recognized in the concurring opinion in Amend v. Bell, 89 Wash. 2d 124, 135, 570
P.2d 138, 144 (1977) (Doiliver, J., concurring), the "specter" of such a battle was "just that: a
ghostly apparition with no substance." The majority opinion in Amend seems result-oriented
when compared with the Supreme Court of Washington's own reasoning in Baumgardner v.
American Motors, 83 Wash. 2d 751, 758, 522 P.2d 829, 833 (1974), a case of first impression
recognizing the right to recover for enhanced injuries:
We strongly disavow the notion that the judicial system is incapable of dealing with a
technical issue simply because it may involve testimony from expert witnesses. That is a
common experience which judges and juries deal with daily. The strength of the system
is that it has absorbed, accommodated and resolved disputes of immense complexity and
novelty. Indeed, this very case involves nothing more complex than an allegedly defec-
tive seat locking mechanism and an allegedly defective seatbelt buckle.
See also Arbet v. Gussarson, 66 Wis. 2d 551, 561-62, 225 N.W.2d 431, 438 (1975).
222. See, e.g., Schnable v. Ford Motor Co., 54 Wis. 2d 345, 347, 195 N.W.2d 602, 604 (seat
belt failed during rollover accident allowing decedent to be thrown about inside vehicle), reh '
denied, 54 Wis. 2d 345, 198 N.W.2d 161 (1972); Engberg v. Ford Motor Co., 87 S.D. 196, 205
N.W.2d 104, 106 (1973) (affirmed judgment for enhanced injuries resulting from seat belt that
severed because it was improperly located causing it to rub on the frame); Endicott v. Nissan
Motor Corp., 73 Cal. App. 3d 917, 921, 141 Cal. Rptr. 95, 97 (1977) (enhanced injury claim based
upon alleged rupturing of seat belt submitted to jury); Trust Corp. of Mont. v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 506 F. Supp. 1093, 1094 (D. Mont. 1981) (enhanced injuries allegedly caused by airplane's
lack of shoulder harnesses); Stahl v. Ford Motor Co., 64 I11. App. 3d 919, 921, 381 N.E.2d 1211,
1212 (1979) (seat belt mechanism detached); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 69, 577
P.2d 1322, 1327 (1978) (failure to equip plane's seats with shoulder harnesses).
As the court noted in Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 452, 323 N.E.2d 164, 168-69, 363
N.Y.S.2d 916, 922 (1974), the effectiveness of seat belts cannot be disputed:
At this juncture, there can be no doubt whatsoever as to the efficiency of the auto-
mobile seat belt in preventing injuries. Simply stated, "[tihe seat belt, properly installed
andpropery worn, still offers the single best protection available to the automotive occu-
pant exposed to an impact." (Snyder, Seat Belt as a Cause ofInjury, 53 MARQ. L. REV.
211). Furthermore, though it has been repeatedly suggested that the seat belt itselfcauses injury, to date the device has n ver been shown to worsen an injury, but, on thecontrary, has prevented more serious ones (p. 213). The studies on the subject over-whelmingly indicate that the seat belt fulfills its purpose of restraining the automobileoccupant during and immediately after the initial impact; in so doing, it significantlyreduces the likelihood of ejection and frequently prevents "the second collision" of theoccupant with the interior portion of the vehice.
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determine what injuries would have been suffered if the occupant had been
wearing a reasonably safe belt. In either case, unsubstantiated claims will be
dismissed by the court as a matter of law.223
Frequently, determining the extent of enhancement associated with the
failure to wear a belt is a simple matter. A seat belt holds an occupant in his
seat and prevents ejection, casting about within the vehicle, and the thrusting
of the head and thorax against the front of the vehicle during its deceleration.
Consequently, the injuries that a seat belt would have prevented are often
readily identifiable. As was the case in Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A. G. 224
and Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G. ,225 many ejection cases involve acci-
dents in which belted claimants would have avoided the entirety of particular
injuries that they suffered. Because a seat belt eliminates certain types of inju-
rious contact, this affirmative defense will, in many instances, not involve an
analysis of the extent to which an inevitable injury was made worse.
Once a state has recognized the availability of the defense, it must define
its effect as an award-reducing factor. In Caiazzo the Second Circuit held that,
in enhanced injury cases, a plaintiff who unreasonably fails to wear his belt
cannot recover damages for any injuries that use of the belt would have pre-
vented.226 The New York rule of law227 applied by the Second Circuit in
Calazzo is the soundest approach228 to the seat belt issue. It is based upon the
Cf. Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 231-32, 160 S.E.2d 65, 69-70 (1968); Kleist, The Seat Belt De-
fense-4n Exercise in Sophistry, 18 HASTrNGS L.J. 613, 614 (1967). See also infra note 232.
223. The defendant has the burden of proving comparative fault. Caiazzo v. Volkswagen-
werk, A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 252 (2d Cir. 1981); Wilson v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 445 F. Supp.
1368, 1373 (E.D. Va. 1978); Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 444, 453, 323 N.E.2d 164, 169, 363
N.Y.S.2d 916, 922 (1974).
224. 647 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1981).
225. 669 F.2d 1199 (8th Cir. 1982).
226. Caiazzo, 647 F.2d at 251-52. The New York seat belt rule invoked in Caiazzo was for-
mulated by the New York Court of Appeals in Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d 44, 323 N.E.2d 164,363
N.Y.S.2d 916 (1974). In Spier the court adopted the following approach:
[B]y not fastening his seat belt the plaintiff may, under the circumstances of the particu-
lar case, be found to have acted unreasonably and in disregard of his own interests, and,
thus, should not be permitted to recover damages for those injuries which a seat belt
would have obviated.
Id at 450-51, 323 N.E.2d at 167, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 920-21.
227. Catazzo, 647 F.2d at 243 was a diversity case involving the application of the substantive
law of New York.
228. The four possible approaches to the seat belt issue are discussed in Kirscher, The Seat
Belt Defense-State of the Law, 53 MARQ. L. Rnv. 172, 173 (1970). In Spier v. Barker, 35 N.Y.2d
444, 450-51, 323 N.E.2d 164, 167, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916, 920-21 (1974), the court rejected two ap-
proaches that define nonuse in terms of contributory negligence. Even in comparative negligence
jurisdictions, the seat belt defense is best characterized as a mitigation of damages rule. However
characterized, in comparative negligence jurisdictions, the defense is an award-reducing factor
rather than an absolute bar. See, e.g., UNiF. COMPARATiVE FAULT ACT § 1, 12 U.L.A. 36 (1977).
The Uniform Comparative Fault Act does not specifically address either enhanced injury litiga-
tion or the seat belt issue. Section 2(b) of the Act provides that, when a plaintiff has acted unrea-
sonably, the trier of fact must determine percentages of causal fault. That approach is
inappropriate in enhanced injury cases involving nonuse of seat belts.
The focus of the defense, once plaintiff's nonuse is characterized as "unreasonable," is upon
the amount of damage the belt would have prevented and not upon a percentage comparison of
causal wrongdoing (the defect that enhances the injury versus the failure to use a safety device
that would itself have, nevertheless, prevented the injury). The latter issue is not one to be submit-
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inherent proviso that, even when a product is defective, a claimant's damages
are limited to those that he could not have reasonably averted.
229
New York's "mitigation rule" is a fair one. A claimant's recovery is not
reduced for his negligence in causing an accident. However an accident is
caused, a manufacturer should be liable when its vehicle does not contain rea-
sonable crash safety features. Accidents are inevitable and the manufacturer's
duty applies to all accidents however caused.230 Conversely, in vehicular acci-
dents, the failure and deformation of component parts, however characterized,
are also inevitable. A seat belt operates as, among other things, a failsafe de-
vice that protects occupants when the inevitable vehicle damage and decelera-
tion occur. Engaging a seat belt is a manifestly simple operation. When there
is no justification for not wearing the belt, it would be unfair to assess damages
for injuries against which the vehicle offered reasonable protection. When the
vehicle as a whole offers reasonable crash protection, the characterization of a
component failure as a "defect" should not be the basis for a damage award.
The New York rule's focus on the claimant's status allows a flexible ap-
proach. When a defect causes an enhancement of injuries, a manufacturer is
liable for those injuries unless it can prove that the claimant acted unreasona-
bly by not wearing a belt. In virtually all cases, the trial court should deter-
mine as a matter of law that an adult's failure to use a belt is unreasonable.
23
'
In an appropriate case, however, the trier of fact should be allowed to deter-
mine whether pregnant women,232 children, or occupants with particular
ted to the trier of fact. It is a philosophical and policy matter that must be resolved by the court.
When considering a similar issue, courts have not allowed the trier of fact to determine whether
vehicular accidents are "foreseeable," thereby requiring a design that provides reasonable protec-
tion to occupants. See supra notes 17-18, 60 and accompanying text. Once the trier of fact deter-
mines that nonuse was unreasonable, it need only determine the full amount of damage that use of
the seat belt would have prevented. In New York, the Spier court decided, without discussion that
if it was unreasonable not to wear a belt under the circumstances, even though a defect causes
injury, a plaintiff cannot recover for any injury that the belt would have prevented. Spier, 35
N.Y.2d at 450-51, 323 N.E.2d at 167, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 920-21. See also Caiazzo v. Volkswagen-
werk, A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 251-52 (2d Cir. 1982).
229. Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 647 F.2d 241,251-52 (2d Cir. 1981); Codling v. Paglia,
32 N.Y.2d 330, 342, 298 N.E.2d 622, 628-29, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 469-70 (1973).
230. See supra notes 195-99 and accompanying text.
231. As a matter of policy, the courts should determine that, unless there is evidence of ajustifiable reason, the trier of fact should be instructed to reduce an enhanced injury award by the
amount of damage that use of the belt would have prevented. When no bona fide excuse is of-
fered, the trier should not be allowed on a case-by-case basis to make value-laden characteriza-
tions as to the "reasonableness' of nonuse. The trier of fact in such cases will simply determine
what damages could have been avoided if the belt had been used. The trier's function does not
include an impressionistic comparison of the defective component and the nonuse of the belt that
would have fully eliminated the effects of the defect. Multiple and diverse triers of fact must not
be allowed to render inconsistent "factual findings" on what is really a broad-based policy
judgment.
232. Experts that have studied the issue recommend that pregnant women wear three.point
belts rather than travel unrestrained. See Crosby, Trauma During Pregnancy: Maternal and Fetal
Injury, 29 OBSTETRICAL & GYNECOLOGICAL SURVEY, 683, 691 (1974); Galle & Anderson,A Case
of 4utomobile Trauma During Pregnancy, 54 OBs-ramIcs & GYNECOLOGY, 467, 469 (1979);
Crosby, King & Stout, Fetal Survival Following Impact: Improvement with Shoulder Harness Re-
straint, 112 AM. J. OF OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY, 1101, 1106 (1972). Lap belt restraints (two-
point belts), however, have been associated with uterine, placental, and fetal injuries. The amount
of force directed to the pregnant uterus when the body of the mother flexes over the lap belt may
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problems acted unreasonably under the circumstances. In such a case, a man-
ufacturer is held liable even though its vehicle was equipped with safety
equipment that could have prevented the injuries. While imperfect, the New
York rule is not unfair to manufacturers. Before the trier even makes a miti-
gation determination, the claimant will have to prove both that one or more
vehicle components were defective and the occurrence of enhancement. In
evaluating the crash safety of such components, moreover, manufacturers are
necessarily aware that not all occupants use their belts.2 33
IV. INDEMNITY AND CONTRIBUTION
Accident claims often involve multiple defendants. Consequently, an es-
sential element of any state's tort system is a set of rules defining the circum-
stances under which one wrongdoer is entitled to indemnity or contribution
from another who is also legally responsible, in whole or in part, for a claim-
ant's injuries. The modem trend, as expressed in the 1977 Uniform Compara-
tive Fault Act,234 is that of establishing pro rata contribution among
tortfeasors based upon proportionate responsibility.235 That concept requires
the trier of fact to make a factual determination about each defendant's per-
centage share of causal fault. The threshold premise of this approach is that
the conduct of the plaintiff and the various wrongdoers can be compared on a
percentage basis.
In ordinary negligence and products liability cases, the Uniform Act of-
fers a fair, practicable and conceptually sound method for allocation of fault.
Using 100 percent as the total proximate fault, the trier of fact can render its
rough judgment about the parties' relative responsibility in causing an acci-
dent. The Uniform Act's approach works well even when both a defendant
driver's negligence and a vehicle defect combine to cause an accident.236
exceed that occurring in unrestrained mothers. Increases in uterine compression caused by such
flexion may result in fetal injury or death. Crosby, King & Stout, supra, at 1101; Crosby, supra, at
691; Pepperell, Rubinstein & Maclssac, Motor- CarAccidents During Pregnancy, 54 OBSTETRICAL
& GYNECOLOGICAL SURVEY, 659, 660-61 (1977). By better distributing the load, three-point belts
sinificantly reduce, but do not necessarily eliminate, the risk of belt-related injuries. Crosby,
King & Stout, supra, at 1101, 1106; Crosby, supra, at 691; Peppere , Rubinstein & Maclssac,
supra, at 660. Physicians have concluded that, on balance, a mother and her fetus are less likely to
suffer traumatic injury if the mother wears a three-point belt rather than travels in an unrestrained
condition. Crosby, upra, at 691; Gale & Anderson, supra, at 468-69.
233. In Ellithorpe v. Ford Motor Co., 503 S.W.2d 516, 521 (Tenn. 1973), an enhanced injury
case in which a Tennessee statute, and not the court, prohibited the seat belt defense, the court
noted that such knowledge justified the rejection of the seat belt defense in its entirety. See also
Amend v. Bell, 89 Wash. 2d 124, 570 P.2d 138, 143 (1977).
234. UNIF. COMPARITIVE FAULT ACT, 12 U.L.A. 35 (Supp. 1979).
235. See id §§ 2 & 4, 12 U.L.A. 38-39, 42-43 (Supp. 1979). Section 2(b) of the Act provides
the following: "In determining the percentages of fault, the trier of fact shall consider both the
nature of the conduct of each party at fault and the extent of the causal relation between the
conduct and the damages claimed." The same approach is taken in the UNIF. PROD. LIABILITY
ACT, §§ 111, 113, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,734-36, 62,739-40 (1979).
236. In resolving contribution or indemnity claims, as long as the focus is exclusively on the
cause of an accident, the conceptual distinction between negligence theory and the doctrine of
strict liability is immaterial. Both types of liability can be meaningfully compared in terms of
their proportionate causal relationship to an accident. See Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal.
3d 725, 734-35, 575 P.2d 1162, 1167-72, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 385-90 (1978). The trier of fact should
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The Uniform Act's rules, however, cannot be applied in cases involving
both an enhanced injury claim and a claim that either negligence or an unre-
lated product defect caused the underlying accident to occur. In cases with
both ordinary tort and enhanced injury components, there is no basis for a
proportionate comparison between the ordinary tort and the defect or activity
causing the enhanced injury. The exclusive focus in an ordinary tort case is on
the causal responsibility for the accident. A tortfeasor causally responsible for
the accident is liable for all of the claimant's resulting damage. Because of
that focus, in an ordinary tort analysis there can be no damage differentiation.
Resolving an enhanced injury claim requires a qualitatively different ap-
proach. Causal responsibility for the underlying accident is irrelevant. In en-
hanced injury litigation, the trier's ultimate task is that of distinguishing
inevitable damage from that which reasonably could have been prevented.
The Uniform Act's proportionate system can be used only to compare
parties' relative responsibility for causing an accident. The extent to which a
defect enhances an injury cannot be compared with another's relative responsi-
bility in causing the underlying accident. For that reason, even in states
adopting the Uniform Act, neither an ordinary tortfeasor nor a defendant
causing an enhanced injury can seek contribution against the other. In such
mixed cases, indemnity is the only measure of recovery. Indemnity, moreover,
is available only to an ordinary tortfeasor. A defendant responsible for caus-
ing an enhanced injury can never recover indemnity against an ordinary
tortfeasor. In all mixed cases, ordinary tortfeasors have a right to be indemni-
fied, by one causing enhanced injuries, for the full amount of the enhanced
injury judgment.
The core principle on which enhanced injury liability is based dictates
such a result. Such liability is premised on the threshold policy judgment that
objects, in many cases because of operator negligence, inevitably will be in-
volved in accidents. However caused, a manufacturer's products must be rea-
sonably designed to minimize the injurious effects of such accidents. A
manufacturer cannot eliminate or reduce his liability to a plaintiff by alleging
that the accident would not have occurred except for the plaintiff's negligence.
For the same reason, in analyzing the relationship between ordinary
tortfeasors and those who cause enhanced injuries, the negligence of ordinary
tortfeasors in causing an accident is wholly immaterial. By definition, in
resolving the plaintiffs prima facie case, the trier of fact determines that, no
matter what caused the accident to occur, the enhanced injuries should not
have resulted from the accident.
The resolution of indemnity claims in cases with both ordinary tort and
enhanced injury components is an exclusively judicial function. That function
is best described in the context of an illustrative case. A typical mixed case
have "no real difficulty" in comparing the kindred concepts of negligence and strict liability in
tort. UNII. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1 comment, 12 U.L.A. 37 (Supp. 1979). Concerns about
semantic and conceptual difficulties involved in comparing "fault" with "strict liability" are




might involve a two vehicle collision in which a truck driver negligently makes
an abrupt, unsignaled left turn in front of a slightly inattentive driver of a
frontally defective van. The van driver suffers a severe leg injury and total
damages of $200,000, $100,000 of which would not have occurred except for
the defect. Application of the Uniform Act's comparative fault provisions
fairly resolves the van driver's claim against the truck driver. Even though the
accident should have caused only $100,000 in damages, the truck driver is
liable for all of plaintiffs damages. 237 If the jury returned a ten percent com-
parative fault finding, the court would enter a $180,000 judgment against the
truck driver. Judgment in the amount of $100,000 would be entered in plain-
tiffs favor against the van manufacturer.
In such a case, plaintiff is entitled to execute his judgments to secure a
total recovery of $190,000. In computing plaintiffs total award, only the
$100,000 damages attributable to his nonenhanced injuries should be sub-
jected to a ten percent comparative reduction. His comparative fault in caus-
ing the accident is not a basis for reducing the enhanced damage component of
his award.238 As a matter of law, the court should further determine that the
truck driver can compel indemnity from the van manufacturer for the full
amount of any execution against the truck driver in excess of $90,000. Be-
tween defendants, the van manufacturer should be ultimately liable for the
$100,000 in damages attributable to the defect in its van.239
This approach has long been followed in analogous cases in which a phy-
sician's subsequent negligence enhances his patient's original injury. In
Zillman v. Mfeadowbrook Hospital24° the New York Court of Appeals deter-
237. Under traditional tort principles, a tortfeasor who causes an accident to occur is liable for
the entirety of the damage caused by the accident. See Mitchell v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 669
F.2d .1199, 1203 (8th Cir. 1982); Zillman v. Meadowbrook Hosp. Co., 45 A.D.2d 267, 269, 358
N.Y.S.2d 466, 469 (1974); UNUo. COMPARATivE FAULT ACT § 2(c), 12 U.L.A. 39 (Supp. 1979);.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435 (1965). An original tortfeasor is liable even for the
portion of a plaintiffs injuries enhanced as a result of a defect in a manufacturer's product. Polk
v. Ford Motor Co., 529 F.2d 259, 268 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 907 (1976); Mitchell, 669
F.2d at 1203; Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 647 F.2d 241, 244 (2d Cir. 1981); Huddell v.
Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 738-39 (3d Cir. 1976). Cf. Section 9 of the Product Liability Act set out in
Senate Bill 2631 (modifying the traditional rule of joint and several liability). Section 9(c)(d) of
the Product Liability Act sets out the following rules:
(c) The court shall enter judgment against each party determined to be liable in
proportion to its percentage of responsibility for the claimant's harm, as determined
under subsection (b)(2), unless section 11(a) requires a different result.
(d) If a claimant has not been able to collect on a judgment in a product liability
action, and if the claimant makes a motion within 1 year after the judgment is entered,
the court shall determine whether any part of the obligation allocated to a person who is
party to the action is not collectable from such a person. Any amount of obligation
which the court determines is uncollectable from that person shall be reallocated to the
other persons who are parties to the action and to whom responsibility was allocated and
to the claimant according to the respective percentages of their responsibility as deter-
mined under subsection (I).
S. 2631, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 9(c)-(d) (1979) (Product Liability Act).
238. The formula to be used in computing the amount of a plaintiffs total recovery appears
infra note 284. For a discussion of the irrelevance of accident-causing fault in enhanced injury
cases, see supra notes 194-98 and accompanying text.
239. See infra notes 240-47 and accompanying text.
240. 45 A.D.2d 267, 358 N.Y.S.2d 466 (1974).
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mined that an original tortfeasor causing an injury-producing accident is lia-
ble to the plaintiff for the full extent of the plaintiffs injury.241  The
physician's liability to the plaintiff is limited to those enhanced damages that
would not have resulted absent his subsequent negligence. 242 In Zllman the
court recognized that such a physician 243 has no right to indemnity from the
origina 244 tortfeasor.24 5 The physician's professional calling and legal duty
was that of treating such an injury however caused.246 He could not justifiably
complain that he would not have been required to engage in his livelihood if
his codefendant had not been negligent. The Ziliman court held that an origi-
nal tortfeasor has a right to indemnity against the negligent physician for that
amount of plaintiffs damages that would not have occurred except for the
negligent medical treatment.247 As between the two defendants in Zillman,
sound policy dictated that the physician be ultimately liable for the enhanced
injuries he caused.
In all cases with both ordinary tort and enhanced injury components, the
ordinary tortfeasor's right to indemnity is automatic and partial. After the
jury returns its verdict, the court need only make mechanical, nondiscretion-
ary determinations wholly based upon the jury's special verdict interrogatory
answers.
VI. CONCLUSION
The distinctive aspects of enhanced injury theory have not, as yet, at-
tracted the interest of Congress, state legislators, or the model code draftsmen.
Furthermore, even the most modern efforts to codify tort reform are imperfect.
Because they do not expressly exclude enhanced injury cases from the applica-
ble scope of their provisions, such codes will necessarily mislead courts and
litigants.
Most courts that have considered the issue have recognized the right of a
wrongfully injured party to recover damages for enhanced injuries. Few judi-
cial decisions, however, have done more than recognize the viability of the
theory. If the litigation of enhanced injury claims is to lead to fair and predict-
able results, it will be necessary for the courts, state legislatures or Congress to
241. Id at 270, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 469. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 457
(1965).
242. Zillman, 45 A.D.2d at 270, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 469.
243. In Zillman the defendant held liable for enhanced injuries was Mid-Island Hospital, the
institution employing that physician. Id. at 270, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 468-69.
244. The original tortfeasor in Zillman was Meadowbrook Hospital Company, the institution
at which plaintiff first received medical treatment. Id at 468-69.
245. Id at 271, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 470-71; Huffman v. Coren, 75 A.D.2d 575, 426 N.Y.S.2d 584(1980).
246. Indemnity or contribution, is, moreover, unnecessary since a person who causes en-
hanced injuries is "ab initio liable to the plaintiff only for the portion of injury" attributable to his
own wrongful act. Huffman v. Coren, 75 A.D.2d 575, 426 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1980).
247. Zillman, 45 A.D.2d at 270, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 470; cf. Huffman v. Coren, 75 A.D.2d 575,
426 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1980) (distinguishing another case in which original tortfeasor had right of
contribution against subsequent tortfeasor).
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make a greater effort in developing a functional analytic framework for such
claims.
Although enhanced injury liability is a simple concept, the litigation of
enhanced injury claims often requires a highly refined trial presentation. Ter-
minological imprecision and faulty analysis have resulted in unnecesary con-
fusion. The terms "second collision" and "crashworthiness" mask the broad
applicability of enhanced injury theory. The term "second collision" is, more-
over, analytically unsound. Both terms should be avoided. Conceptual confu-
sion can be eliminated, and complexity minimized, if the courts avoid the
mechanical application of inappropriate concepts from other areas of tort law.
In developing a systematic approach to enhanced injury litigation, the courts
should instead concern themselves with the underlying policies and philoso-
phy of enhanced injury theory.
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APPENDIX: JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND THE VERDICT FoRM
In jury cases, the trial judge must instruct the jury on the legal standards
governing its deliberations. The court's jury instructions must define en-
hanced injury theory in terms that will be understood by the average layman.
Few judicial decisions have considered this critical aspect of enhanced injury
litigation. As a result, there is no general agreement on the number or form of
the instructions that should be submitted to a jury in an enhanced injury case.
Fortunately, the analytical language and policies expressed in Larsen v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp. 248 and other well-reasoned decisions provide a sound basis
for the drafting of enhanced injury instructions.
A trial judge should read an advance oral instruction to all of the prospec-
tive jurors before jury selection. Such an advance instruction might take the
following form in a case with both ordinary negligence and enhanced injury
components:
This is a civil case by plaintiff John Smith against defendant
Robert Jones and National Motor Company. The case arises out of
leg injuries suffered by Mr. Smith on January 2, 1984, when his 1965
National Motor Company van was involved in a collision with Rob-
ert Jones' truck. Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Jones negligently drove his
truck and that such alleged negligence was a proximate cause of
plaintiff's injuries. Defendant Robert Jones denies plaintifis claim.
Mr. Jones further alleges that plaintiff negligently drove his van and
that such alleged negligence was a proximate cause of his own
injuries.
Plaintiff and defendant Jones have not alleged that the National
Motor Company van caused the accident to occur. They have al-
leged that the National van did not provide a reasonably safe envi-
ronment for its occupants during accidents. In that regard, they have
alleged that the injuries plaintiff suffered in the accident were in-
creased over and above those he would have suffered in a reasonably
safe van. National Motor Company denies this claim. National fur-
ther alleges that Mr. Smith acted unreasonably in not wearing his
seat belt and that this failure caused his injuries to be more severe
than those he would have suffered had he been wearing the belt.
Both defendants deny the extent of plaintiff's alleged damages.
When submitting that same illustrative case to the jury, the court would
necessarily provide the jury with instructions that specifically address the en-
hanced injury claim. The legal standards that relate solely to the illustrative
enhanced injury issues can be addressed in four separate instructions. The
general subject matter of those four instructions, which could be submitted in
the following form, would be a recitation of plaintiff's claim and codefendants
cross-claim against the manufacturer, a description of the manufacturer's
duty, a statement of plaintiff's burden of proving the enumerated elements of
248. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
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an enhanced injury case, and a statement of the manufacturer's burden of
proving its comparative fault defense:
A. Statement of Claim Instruction
Plaintiff has filed this case against National Motor Company for
personal injuries he sustained in his January 2, 1984 vehicular acci-
dent. On that date, plaintiff was driving his 1965 National Motor
Company van when it was involved in an impact with Robert Jones'
truck. Defendant Jones has filed a crossclaim against National for
any damages that he may be held liable to pay plaintiff.
You are instructed that the National van was not a proximate
cause of the accident itself. Plaintiff and defendant Jones claim,
however, that the van was not reasonably safe as designed by Na-
tional. In that respect, they allege that the van was not reasonably
designed to minimize the injury-producting effect of impacts with
other vehicles or objects. Plaintiff and defendant Jones specifically
contend that one or more of the following alleged deficiencies ren-
dered the van not reasonably safe:
1. Inadequate structural and energy-absorbing members in the
front of the vehicle;
2. Placement of occupants' lower extremities in an impact
crush zone where a frontal collision will cause severe inward vehicu-
lar intrusion;
3. The use of passenger compartment components that deform
upon impact in a way that causes occupant injury.
Plaintiff and defendant Jones claim that because of the van's al-
leged safety deficiencies plaintiff suffered damages over and above
the damage he would have suffered if the van had been reasonably
safe.
National Motor Company denies these claims and further de-
nies the extent of plaintiffs damages.
The foregoing is merely a summary of the claims against Na-
tional Motor Company. You are not to take the same as proof of the
matters claimed, and you are to consider only those matters which
are established by the evidence. These claims have been outlined
solely to aid you in understanding the issues.249
B. Duty Instruction
A manufacturer of motor vehicles has a duty to take reasonable
steps in the design of its vehicles to minimize the injury-producing
effects of impacts with other vehicles or objects. If a manufacturer's
vehicle is not reasonably safe, the manufacturer is liable to plaintiff
but only for the portion of plaintiffs damages caused by the unsafe
249. This instruction follows the general statement of claim format set out in ILL. PATIrRN




design that is over and above the damages that probably would have
occurred even if the vehicle had been reasonably safe.250
C. Elements of Proof Instruction
Plaintiff and defendant Jones have the burden of proving each
of the following propositions against National Motor Company:
1. That the 1965 National Motor Company van was not rea-
sonably safe;2sI
2. That there was, at the time the 1965 National van was
designed and manufactured, an alternative, safer design for the front
end of the vehicle;252
3. That front-end safety deficiencies in National's 1965 van
were a proximate cause of damage to plaintiff over and above the
damage he would probably have suffered if the alternative safer de-
sign discussed in paragraph 2 of this instruction had been used and
had been subjected to the same accident;253
4. The extent to which plaintiff's injuries were increased over
and above what they probably would have been if said alternative
design had been used and had been subjected to the same
accident. 254
In determining whether the four elements have been proved,
you should be guided by the following principles:
1. With respect to the first element of proof, you are instructed
that National Motor Company's duty was not that of manufacturing
a vehicle that would guarantee absolute safety to its users in the
event of an accident. 255 "Reasonable safety" as that term is used in
these instructions is a relative rather than an absolute concept. 256
The vehicle at issue in this case is a van. The safety of the 1965 Na-
tional van is to be evaluated only by what is reasonable, practical
and appropriate for that type of vehicle.257 In determining whether
National employed a reasonably safe design for its 1965 van, you
should consider the following:
250. This language is taken from Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 503 (8th Cir.
1968). A similar instruction was given in McGee v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 82 Cal. App. 3d 1005,
1013, 147 Cal. Rptr. 694, 698-99 (1978).
251. The states have used different terminology in addressing the "defect" issue in strict liabil-
ity in tort actions. See supra notes 4, 123. This formulation of the breach of duty issue is the one
used in Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 154, 542 P.2d 774, 779 (1975).
252. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
253. This.language is taken from Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 503 (8th Cir.
1968).
254. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
256. This language is taken from Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d
774, 779 (1975). See also Curtis v. General Motors Corp., 649 F.2d 808, 811 (10th Cir. 1981);
Dreisonstock v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1070-73 (4th Cir. 1974); Wilson v. Volk-
swagen of Am., Inc., 445 F. Supp. 1368, 1372 (E.D. Va. 1978); Dyson v. General Motors Corp.,
298 F. Supp. 1064, 1073 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
257. See Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1070-73 (4th Cir. 1974), supra
notes 70-77, 254-55 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 62
ENHANCED INJURY
(a) The date of manufacture of the van;2 58
(b) The style and utility inherent in that type of vehicle;259
(c) The price of the vehicle;260
(d) The function and safety of the vehicle and its component
parts as compared to similar component parts of a comparable van.
In that regard, you are instructed that a vehicle is not necessarily
unsafe merely because it is not the latest, best, or safest design.26 1
The availability and performance capabilities of other designs is only
one factor for you to consider in determining whether a given design
is reasonably safe;
(e) The obviousness of the design of the 1965 National van to
the average user;2 6 2
(f) The nature and circumstances of the accident, including the
speed the vehicles were traveling at the time of impact, the parts of
the vehicles involved in the impact, the severity of the impact, and
the manner in which the van responded to the impact.26
3
In determining whether the van was reasonably safe, you should
not consider the negligence, if any, of John Smith or Robert Jones in
causing the accident.264 While relevant to other aspects of this case,
why the accident occurred has no bearing on your determination of
whether the van responded in a reasonably safe manner to the
accident.
2. As used in paragraph 2 and elsewhere in this instruction, the
phrase "alternative design" means an alternate design for the front
end of a van, available to National when265 it manufactured its 1965
model year van, that was reasonably safe, practicable, and appropri-
ate for that type of vehicle.
258. The relevant test is whether the product was defective "at the time" it left the control of
the manufacturer. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A comment g (1965). See also
Stonehocker v. General Motors Corp., 587 F.2d 151, 156 (4th Cir. 1978); Ward v. Hobart Mfg.
Co., 450 F.2d 1176, 1182 n.16 (5th Cir. 1971).
259. Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1073-75 (4th Cir. 1974). See also
supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
260. Wooten v. White Trucks, 514 F.2d 634, 636 (5th Cir. 1975); Dreisonstok v. Volkswagen-
werk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1072-73 (4th Cir. 1974); Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Young, 272 Md.
201, 219, 321 A.2d 737, 746-47 (1974); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 154,
542 P.2d 774, 779 (1975).
261. It is important to caution a jury that a manufacturer is not legally required to use the
most technologically advanced and safest design available. Price, function, and the frequency and
gravity of occupant risks are among the elements that must be evaluated in resolving the breach of
duty issue. See supra notes 257-60 and infra 262-63. See also Ward v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 450 F.2d
1176, 1182 (5th Cir. 1971); Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064, 1073-74 (E.D. Pa.
1969); Thomas v. General Motors Corp., 13 Cal. App. 3d 81, 88-89, 91 Cal. Rptr. 301, 305 (1970).
A product is not defective merely because it could have been made even safer. Curtis v. General
Motors Corp., 649 F.2d 808, 811 (10th Cir. 1981); Weakley v. Fishback & Moore, Inc., 515 F.2d
1260, 1267-68 (5th Cir. 1975).
262. The reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer are central to the design issue.
Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 154, 542 P.2d 774, 779 (1975). As the court
recognized in Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066, 1073 (4th Cir. 1974), "a Cad-
illac maybe expected to include more in the way of... 'crashworthiness' than the economy car."
263. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 195-205, 236-47 and accompanying text.
265. See supra note 258.
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3. In determining whether the third element has been proved,
you must compare plaintiffs actual injuries to those that he would,
more probably than not, have suffered if the alternative design for
the van's front end had been used and subjected to the very same
accident. 266 You must determine that plaintiff has proved this ele-
ment if you find that his actual injuries were more severe than those
he would have suffered if the alternative design had been involved in
this accident. A plaintiff suffers "more severe" injuries, as that
phrase is used in these instructions, when he either suffers an addi-
tional injury of a type that he would not otherwise have suffered at
all or when he suffers a worse injury to a particular body part than he
would otherwise have suffered. 267 It is possible that a plaintiff's inju-
ries can be made more severe in both respects. If you determine that
plaintiffs injuries would not have been less severe in a vehicle using
the alternative design that he has proposed, you must determine that
plaintiff and defendant Jones have not proved the third element of
proof.
4. If you determine that plaintiff's injuries were increased as a
result of the van not being reasonably safe, then you must compute
the extent to which the injuries were so increased.26s The law has
not furnished us with any fixed method for computing the fourth ele-
ment of proof.269 In determining the extent to which plaintiff's ac-
tual injuries were increased, you must be governed by your own
judgment,2 70 by the evidence in the case and by these instructions.
Plaintiff is not required to prove the extent of increased injury with
mathematical precision.271 Your award, however, must be based
upon evidence and not upon speculation, guess, or conjecture. 272
The damage elements for the injuries plaintiff allegedly suffered
in the actual accident are listed in the general damage instruction
that I will later read to you. In determining the extent to which
plaintiffs injuries were increased, you should compare each element
of damage actually suffered to each element of damage that would,
more probably than not, have been suffered in a van having the alter-
native design.
Your answers to the questions set out on the verdict form will
allow the court to resolve Mr. Jones' crossclaim against National.
The net effect of the crossclaim is that, as between the two defend-
ants, National, and not Mr. Jones, will be ultimately liable to plain-
266. See su.pra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
267. Lee v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 1982-1983 PROD. LzAB. REP. (CCH) 1 9399, at 22,701
(Okla. 1982) (motion for rehearing pending).
268. See sufpra notes 93-94, 136-37 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
270. Id
271. Id
272. See CALIF. CIVIL JURY INSTRS. 14.60 (1977); ILL. PATTERN JURY INSTRS.-CIVIL 1.01
(West 1965); Mo. APPRovED JURY INSTS. 2.01 (Vernon Law Book Co. 1964); WASH. CIVIL PAT-




tiff for that portion of plaintiff's damages, if any, that you find are
attributable to an unsafe condition in the National van.
D. Mitigation of Damage Instruction
You are instructed that Mr. Smith acted unreasonably in not
wearing his seat belt.273 If you determine that an unsafe condition in
the van increased Mr. Smith's injuries over and above those he
would otherwise have suffered, you will then determine which of
those injuries he would have avoided had he been wearing his seat
belt. 274 Mr. Smith's recovery against National will be reduced by the
monetary value of the injuries that use of the seat belt would have
avoided.275
National has the burden of proving that the seat belt would have
lessened plaintiffs injuries and the extent to which those injuries
would have been reduced.276 National is not required to prove the
extent of injury reduction with mathematical precision. Your deter-
mination, however, must be based upon evidence and not upon spec-
ulation, guess, or conjecture. 277
The verdict form submitted by the court should be clear and as simply
phrased as possible. It must, however, elicit several specific findings that will
allow the court both to resolve automatically an ordinary tortfeasor's cross-
claim and to reduce plaintiff's total damages in proportion to his comparative
fault or his failure to mitigate enhanced injuries. A special verdict form2 78 for
Mr. Smith's illustrative case might be organized, and answered, in the follow-
ing manner:
We, the jury, make the following answers to the questions submitted by
the court:
1. Was there negligence on the part of Robert Jones?
ANSWER: Yes (Yes or No)2 7 9
(If this question is answered "no," do not answer Questions 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6.)
2. Was Mr. Jones' negligence a proximate cause of plaintiff's accident?
273. This direction is based upon the hypothetical assumption that there was no arguable
justification, and therefore no issue of fact, regarding nonuse of the belt. See supra notes 227-34
and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 226-33 and accompanying text.
275. Id
276. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
277. See supra note 272 and accompanying text. A similar instruction was given in Wilson v.
Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 445 F. Supp. 1368, 1373 (E.D. Va. 1978).
278. Special verdict interrogatories assist juries to focus upon the proper issues in complicated
cases. Bauman v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 621 F.2d 230, 235-36 (6th Cir. 1980). Cf. Higginbot-
ham v. Ford Motor Co., 540 F.2d 762, 765 (5th Cir. 1976) ("irreconcilable inconsistency" injury's
answers to two interrogatories required a reversal).
279. See 2 E. DEviTr & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 74.10
(1977). This and special verdict interrogatories two through six, as set out in this hypothetical
verdict form, are standard special verdict interrogatories directed to the negligence, proximate
cause, damage, and comparative negligence issues. See, e.g., id; CALIF. JURY INSTRS. 14.96 (West
1977); WASH. CIVIL PATTERN JURY INSTRs. 45.02 (West 1980).
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ANSWER: Yes (Yes or No)
(If this question is answered "no," do not answer Questions 3, 4, 5 or 6.)
3. What is the total amount of plaintiff's damages suffered as a result of
the accident?
ANSWER: $200,000
4. Was there negligence by plaintiff in the driving of his vehicle?
ANSWER: Yes (Yes or No)
(If this question is answered "no," do not answer Questions 5 or 6.)
5. Was plaintiff's negligence in driving his vehicle a proximate cause of
the accident?
ANSWER: Yes (Yes or No)
(If this question is answered "no," do not answer Question 6.)
6. Using 100% as the total combined negligence of plaintiff and defend-
ant Robert Jones in causing the accident, what percentage of that neg-
ligence is attributable to plaintiff?
ANSWER: 10%
7. Was the 1965 National van that plaintiff was driving reasonably safe?
ANSWER: No (Yes or No) 280
(If this question is answered "yes," do not answer any further questions.)
8. Did the unsafe condition of the van increase plaintiffs injuries over
and above those he would more probably than not have suffered in a
van having a safer design?
ANSWER: Yes (Yes or No) 281
(If this question is answered "no," do not answer any further questions.)
9. State the amount of money that fairly compensates plaintiff for inju-
ries caused by the van's unsafe condition over and above the injuries
he probably would have suffered if the safer design had been used
and subjected to the same accident.
ANSWER: $100,000282
10. With respect to the dollar amount you returned in Answer No. 9,
what injuries and related damages, expressed in dollar amount,





On the basis of the special verdict answers, the court would enter judg-
ment in favor of plaintiff and against defendant Jones in the sum of $180,000,
280. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 250-54 and accompanying text.
282. Id
283. See supra notes 273-77 and accompanying text.
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enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and against National in the sum of
$50,000, allow plaintiff to execute his judgments for a total recovery of
$185,000,284 and recognize defendant Jones' right to compel indemnity against
National for the amount of any plaintiff's execution in excess of $135,000. 285
284. A plaintiff will never be allowed to execute his judgments for an amount in excess of the
trier of fact's total damage finding. In Smith v. Jones, Smith's total recovery could not exceed the
$200,000 finding set out in Answer No. 3. Because of his comparative fault in causing the acci-
dent, the plaintiffs total recovery must be for a lesser amount. The exact amount of a plaintiff's
total recovery in such a mixed case can be calculated by applying the formula (Answer 9 - An-
swer 10) + ((Answer 3) - (Answer 9 - Answer 10) X (100% - Answer 6)) = Total Recovery. In
Smith v. Jones the court would make the following sequential calculations:
(1) TR = ($100,000 - $50,000) + (($200,000 - $50,000) x (.90))
(2) TR = $50,000 + ($150,000 x .90)
(3) TR = $50,000 + $135,000
(4) TR = $185,000
Such a formula offers a balanced approach. It allows the plaintiff to receive the most
favorable damage award consistent with the theoretical underpinnings upon which his enhanced
injury and ordinary tort claims are based. The formula does not allow him to secure a windfall.
In conceptual terms, the formula recognizes that Net Enhanced Damages (Gross Enhanced
Damages minus Enhanced Damages Plaintiff Unreasonably Failed to Avert) + Prorated Re-
maining Damages (the difference between Total Damages and Net Enhanced Damages and re-
duction of that amount by the percentage of accident-related fault) = Total Recovery. Because
Smith suffered $50,000 in compensable enhanced damages, he recovers that amount. His negli-
gence in causing the accident is not a basis for reducing that claim. See supra notes 194-98 and
accompanying text. Subject to reduction for Smith's comparative negligence, defendant Jones is
liable to Smith for the entirety of his damages, including the $50,000 damage that a seat belt
would have prevented. See supra note 237 and accompanying text. Because Smith's ordinary tort
claim is the only basis for recovery of the remaining $150,000 of the $200,000 in total damages, the
full $150,000 should be subjected to a 10% comparative negligence reduction.
The total recovery formula produces fair results even in mixed cases involving markedly
different special verdict answers. If Smith suffered $200,000 total damages, $175,000 of which
were enhanced, unreasonably failed to avoid $125,000 of his enhanced damages, and was 80%
causally responsible for the accident, he would be awarded judgments of $40,000 and $50,000
against Jones and National, respectively. Smith would be permitted to execute those judgments
until he secured a total recovery of $80,000.
285. National should be ultimately responsible for $50,000 of the $185,000 recovery since
those damages should not have occurred even in a negligently caused accident. See supra notes
194-98, 239-47 and accompanying text.
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